uranium_radioactive_nuclear_rays-scaledWe have all heard the saying “time is of the essence.” This is especially true when you are filing a lawsuit. If you do not comply with the statutory requirements for how long you have to file a lawsuit, a court will be unable to hear your claim. Although certain exceptions apply that extend your timeline for filing a lawsuit, there are strict evidentiary requirements for these exceptions to apply. 

Julius Lennie worked for a Company that cleaned pipes in oilfields. The cleaning process allegedly involved the emission of naturally occurring radioactive material. About fifteen years after retiring, Lennie was diagnosed with lung cancer and died shortly thereafter. Four years later, his surviving spouse and children filed a lawsuit against various companies for whom Lennie had cleaned their oilfield pipes. They claimed Lennie had been exposed to harmful levels of radiation, causing his lung cancer and death. They claimed the companies had been aware of the dangers of the radioactive materials but did not warn Lennie about the dangerous or take adequate precautions. The Lennies claimed they were not aware about the radiation exposure until less than a year before they filed their lawsuit, when one of Lennie’s children read about it in the newspaper and they met with an attorney. The Lennies claimed the companies had actively concealed the existence of the naturally occurring radioactive materials. 

Because the Lennies filed their lawsuit over a year after Lennie’s death, the defendants filed peremptory exceptions of prescription, claiming they were required to have filed their lawsuit within one year of his death, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2315.1. The Lennies claimed they did not have any actual or constructive knowledge of their claims until less than a year before they filed the lawsuit, because the companies had concealed it. The trial court granted the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of prescription, finding there was not sufficient evidence the defendants had concealed the existence of the naturally occurring radioactive material such that the Lennies did not have knowledge of their possible claims. The Lennies appealed.

rim_tire_wheel_round-scaledIn the heart of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, tragedy struck on Interstate 10 as a routine drive turned fatal. Arthur Huguley, behind the wheel of a tractor-trailer for AAA Cooper Transportation, found himself in a situation that would forever alter the lives of those involved. A blown-out tire, a series of events, and a wrongful death lawsuit brought forth by Curley Mouton’s surviving family members set the stage for a courtroom drama that unfolded with unexpected twists. In the end, a jury assigned fault, but the defendants, Huguley, AAA Cooper, and their insurer, were not ready to accept the verdict without a fight. This article explores the intricacies of their appeal, shedding light on the compelling arguments presented and the complexities of apportioning fault in a tragic accident.

Arthur Huguley was driving a tractor-trailer in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, on Interstate 10 while working for AAA Cooper Transportation (“AAA Cooper”).  Huguley heard a bang and worried he might have blown out a tire. While performing a maneuver to see if he had blown out a tire, the tire that had blown out came apart and flew into the air. Curley Mouton was driving in a truck behind Huguley when debris from the tire started flying through the air. The debris hit Mouton’s truck, causing him to hit a guardrail, flip over, and crash. Mouton died in the crash. 

Mouton’s surviving spouse and son filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Huguley, AAA Cooper, and their insurer. A jury found in favor of Mouton’s family and assigned 10% fault to Huguley and 90% to AAA Cooper for putting a defective tire on its truck. The defendants appealed, claiming the jury had erred in its ruling.

fire_orange_emergency_burning-scaledIn a world where news headlines often feature calamitous industrial disasters, it’s hardly surprising to find legal battles trailing in their wake. The following case involves multiple individuals who filed lawsuits against the owner of a facility in Iberia Parish, Louisiana, that had a large fire. 

A fire at a facility owned by Multi-Chem Group caused multiple explosions, which released chemicals. Following the fire and explosions, multiple people filed lawsuits against Multi-Chem and others, alleging they had been exposed to hazardous materials. The multiple lawsuits were consolidated into three groups based on the distance the injured party was located from the fire source. At trial, the parties presented expert testimony about whether the plaintiffs were exposed to hazardous materials from the Multi-Chem fire and if they suffered damages due to the exposure. The trial court held that the plaintiffs had established exposure and awarded damages to the three groups. The damages included medical expenses, general damages, and mental anguish related to the fear of developing cancer. Multi-Chem filed an appeal. 

On appeal, Multi-Chem argued the trial court erred in admitting and excluding certain expert testimony. Article 702 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence governs expert testimony. At trial, the trial court evaluated the expert witnesses’ relevant credentials when deciding whether and to what extent to credit the expert witnesses’ testimony. The court also analyzed the underlying data the experts used as the basis for their opinions. Therefore, the appellate court found Multi-Chem’s argument that the trial court erred in which expert testimony it admitted and excluded lacked merit. 

dsc05934_0-scaledDealing with the aftermath of a flood is never fun. This is especially true when the flood damages one of your vehicles. This is the situation Michael Jacobs found himself in after one of his cars was damaged in a flood. After a long fight with his insurance company, he eventually prevailed and was awarded damages. 

Jacobs owned multiple vehicles that GEICO insured. His parish in North Louisiana was affected by heavy flooding. When the flooding started, Jacobs and his brother tried to move the vehicles from his house to higher ground but were unable to remove them before the floodwaters rose, so they could not drive up to the house. Jacobs waded through the floodwater to retrieve one of the vehicles, a 2001 Honda Accord. In the days following the flood, the Honda kept overheating. Jacobs claimed this had only occurred after the flood. 

Jacobs submitted a claim to GEICO for the damage to the vehicle. The insurance inspector did not identify any flood-related problems and determined the upper radiator hose had blown out. Another mechanic gave Jacobs an opinion and concluded there were issues with his spark plugs. GEICO ultimately denied Jacobs’ claim because it had suffered a mechanical failure that was not flood-related. Jacobs filed a lawsuit against GEICO, alleging his Honda had been damaged from the flooding. At trial, the court ruled the Honda had suffered water damage and awarded vehicle property damages and attorney fees. GEICO filed an appeal.

clocks_clock_time_watch-scaledPrescription. Some may relate this term to the medical field and taking pills. But in Louisiana, it has an entirely new meaning. Think of the common phrase “the statute of limitations” many other states use. It’s just like that. A limit is set that blocks claims from being brought after a certain amount of time has passed from the original incident. In this case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal addresses whether an insurance company’s peremptory exception of prescription could be sustained. 

On July 21, 2012, Michael Jones rear-ended Carlos Russell (“plaintiff”) while both vehicles were parked, waiting to unload their dump trucks in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. At the time of the incident, Jones was within the scope of employment with Riley & Carroll Properties (“R & C”).  Determining the scope of employment is important because an employee can only collect worker’s compensation benefits for any injuries that arise within the scope of employment. After the accident, State National Insurance Company (“SNIC”) paid Carlos Russell $8,738.52 for property damage to his vehicle.

Exactly one year later, on July 21, 2013, Russell filed a personal injury claim against R & C, Jones, and SNIC. Later, Russell amended the lawsuit to include his own insurance company and Ernest Riley, the trucking company’s owner, as defendants. It was found later in 2017 that Scottsdale Insurance Company carried general liability insurance coverage for Jones, Riley, and R & C. That meant that Russell could also add Scottsdale as another defendant to the claim.

workers_construction_worker_work-scaledIf you are injured on the job, one of your primary concerns is likely finding competent medical care. Under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act, injured workers can select one physician of any specialty without their employer’s approval. What happens if your employer refuses to pay for your selected physician? 

Marvin Ray Scott brought a workers’ compensation claim against his employer, Packaging Corporation of America (“PCA.”) Scott claimed he had lost his hearing because of his work at the Boise Paper Mill in DeRidder, Louisiana. Scott then filed a motion to have an expedited hearing under La. R.S. 23:1121. Scott claimed PCA had not authorized his initial visit to his selected physician. PCA responded, claiming Scott had improperly used summary proceedings because he was not just trying to get approval for his selected physician, but he was also seeking attorney’s fees and penalties. At the hearing, the workers’ compensation judge ruled in favor of Scott and ordered PCA to pay Scott’s relevant medical bills and pay separate penalties and attorney’s fees, totaling $7,000. PCA filed an appeal.

Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act sets forth rights and remedies for injured workers. Under La. R.S. 23:1121, an employee is permitted to select one physician of any specialty without their employer’s approval. If the employer denies that, the employee is entitled to an expedited proceeding. Under La. R.S. 23:1201(F), the employer can also be required to pay penalties and attorneys’ fees if it does not comply with its statutory obligations to an injured worker. 

courthouse_311_jarvis_st-scaledWhen you think about medical malpractice lawsuits, a botched surgery or missed diagnosis are likely the first things that come to mind. The following case involves a less common situation involving purported medical malpractice involving physical therapy post-surgery. It analyzes the relationship between a doctor and a physical therapist and whether a doctor can be vicariously liable for the actions of a physical therapist.

Jean McKeogh underwent a total shoulder arthroplasty, which Dr. Michael O’Brien performed. Following the surgery, Dr. O’Brien saw McKeogh for office visits at a Tulane University clinic. Part of McKeogh’s follow-up care involved physical therapy, which was located in the same building as Dr. O’Brien’s offices. McKeogh went to physical therapy but subsequently told Dr. O’Brien she thought she had been injured during it. A CT scan showed she had fractured her elbow. McKeough then had a frozen shoulder and had to have a second surgery. 

As a result of the injury and alleged negligence, McKeough requested a medical review panel. In her complaint, she claimed Dr. O’Brien had not used reasonable care with respect to his post-surgery care for her, including with respect to the physical therapy he prescribed. The medical review panel determined Robin Silverman, the physical therapist, had not satisfied the applicable standard of care. However, the medical review panel found there was no evidence to support a finding that Dr. Brien and Tulane had not met the applicable standard of care. 

addiction_bet_betting_casino-scaledLawsuits involving slip and fall accidents are widespread. However, specific requirements must be satisfied to prevail in a slip-and-fall case. The following lawsuit helps answer the question: Can a business be held liable if a patron slips and falls on a wet walkway? 

While walking with her son in the Treasure Chest Casino parking lot, Linda Cangelosi slipped and fell under the outdoor tent that covered part of the walkway entrance into the casino. Cangelosi slipped while stepping from the roadway to the walkway. At the time of her fall, the ground was wet, with puddles. After he fell, employees of Treasure Chest Casino assisted Cangelosi and called an emergency team. Cangelosi declined their offer to transport her to the hospital and continued to the casino. However, about 45 minutes later, she left because her hip hurt. She consulted with a doctor, who provided her with pain medication. Since the accident, Cangelosi had to use a walker and has been in pain. Cangelosi filed a lawsuit against Treasure Chest Casino. Both Cangelosi and Treasure Chest Casino filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Treasure Chest Casino’s summary judgment motion. Cangelosi appealed. 

Under La. C.C. art. 2317, the owner of a thing is liable for damage if they knew or should have known about the defect that causes damage, which could have been prevented if the owner had exercised reasonable care. Further, under La. C.C. art. 2322, this also applies to building owners. Therefore, if Cangelosi provided sufficient evidence that Treasure Chest Casino knew or should have known about the wet walkway that caused her slip and did not act reasonably, she could prevail in her lawsuit.

ladder_art_red_garden-scaledIt can be challenging to interpret insurance policies, especially when they involve complex provisions such as coverage for an additional insured. Before signing an insurance policy, it is imperative to understand its language and what it does and does not cover. Here, the plain language of the insurance policy proved instrumental in the appellate court’s ruling.

Pamela Sloane was injured while working for Integrity Cleaning Services (“Integrity”) at Forestwood Apartments. She was cleaning a ceiling fan while standing on a ladder. She inadvertently touched an exposed wire, which electrocuted her, and she fell from the ladder. Sloane filed a lawsuit against CLK Multifamily Management (“CLK”) and others. Sloane claimed CLK had not adequately maintained the premises or warned of the dangerous condition of the exposed wire. CLK filed its answer to the lawsuit, denying the allegations, and added Travelers Indemnity (“Travelers”) to the lawsuit.  CLK claimed Integrity was contractually required to have a general liability insurance policy that covered CLK as additional insureds. 

Travelers filed a summary judgment motion, claiming CLK was not an additional insured under the policy. Travelers attached a copy of the relevant insurance policy to its summary judgment motion. CLK disagreed and claimed it was indeed an additional insured.  The trial court concluded CLK was not qualified as an additional insured and granted Travelers’ summary judgment motion. 

green_mold_harmful_moldIf you have experienced symptoms from working in a moldy work environment, you might think you are entitled to recover from your employer. However, navigating the Workers’ Compensation system can be challenging partly because of the distinct and often complicated vocabulary in the statutes. This case involves defining an occupational disease under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.

Angela Lyle worked in the payroll department at Brock Services. Her office was in a trailer in Norco, Louisiana, at the Valero plant. Lyle claimed she saw mold throughout the trailer that increased over the two years she worked at the site. She suffered from fatigue, burning eyes, sores, and other symptoms. After suffering a nosebleed, she underwent a medical evaluation. Testing confirmed mold was present in the office, so Lyle’s trailer was replaced. Once the trailer was replaced, some of Lyle’s symptoms went away, but others persisted, and new symptoms emerged. 

She resigned and was diagnosed with sarcoidosis in her lungs and lymph nodes. She then filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation, claiming she had suffered an occupational disease and was entitled to damages. The workers’ compensation judge denied her claim as neither her mold exposure nor the development of sarcoidosis qualified as an occupational disease or accident under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. Brock filed a summary judgment motion, arguing Lyle could not establish sarcoidosis was an occupational disease. The workers’ compensation judge granted Brock’s summary judgment motion, finding Lyle’s sarcoidosis was not an “occupational disease. Lyle appealed, arguing the workers’ compensation judge ignored the definition of an “occupational disease” under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.

Contact Information