Articles Posted in Legal Definitions

Do you drive an automobile insured through an employer? How well do you know the policy? It’s possible that you aren’t covered as well as you think.

The petitioners of Broussard v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. were merely seeking coverage compensation after a seemingly simple traffic accident in Maurice, Louisiana. They ended up in court and dealt with costly appeals over whether or not the driver of the other automobile, a dump truck, was insured by the business who hired him for this particular haul. The driver, who owned the dump truck, was a contractor, and thus not an employee. As a result, he was screened out of much of the hiring company’s insurance policies, thus potentially inhibiting the petitioners’ attempt to recover.

The major questions regarding the insurance coverage were over the definition of a “hired” auto and the definition of a “nonowned auto,” in light of the specific policy at hand. While it may seem at first glance that the dump truck had to qualify under one of these categories, the court found there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the company had “hired” the truck or “hired” the services of the driver. This distinction is important because specifically hiring the truck would result in coverage under this insurance policy, whereas hiring the full services of a driver would not result in coverage for the truck. The court considered invoice tickets engaging the driver’s company generally, and not a specific vehicle, to be a relevant factor in deciding this issue.

Uninsured motorist (UM) coverage protects drivers from individuals not carrying sufficient insurance. The importance of such coverage makes waiving it a somewhat complicated procedure, designed to make sure the driver truly does not want it. A case in Abbeville, Louisiana, illustrates the complexities of when corporations waive UM coverage on company automobiles.

Plaintiff James Bergeron sued to recover damages after being rearended in the vehicle provided by his employer, Murphy Oil. All defendants were dismissed from the suit except Liberty Mutual, which contended it didn’t include uninsured motorist coverage in the policy it issued to Murphy Oil.

In Louisiana, uninsured motorist coverage is provided by a specific statute, La.R.S. 22:1295. Court decisions have recognized the importance of UM insurance as a matter of public policy, to the extent that the coverage is implied as an amendment to any automobile liability policy (even policies not expressly providing for it).

Settling with an insurance company out of court is commonplace in the legal world. However, entering into a “High/Low” agreement prior to trial can come back to hurt a plaintiff and should be carefully worded and considered before executed. The cost of this kind of failure is exemplified in Soileau v. Smith True Value and Rental.

In November 2007, plaintiff Mary Solieau sustained serious injuries when a John Deere front-end loader detached from a John Deere tractor and shattered her leg while she was supervising the cleaning out of canals for the Town of Mamou. The tractor was rented from Smith’s Hardward, insured by Defendant Hartford Insurance Company.

Before proceeding to trial, Solieau entered into a “high/low” agreement with Hartford, capping Hartford’s liability at its policy limit of $2,500,000 and further releasing the Smiths of any personal obligation. At trial, Solieau moved to dismiss the Smiths, which led to Hartford filing for a directed verdict based on the language of its policy, which obligated Hartford to pay only those sums that its insured becomes legally obligated to pay. The trial court denied the motion.

Summary judgment is a mechanism used when one party clearly deserves to win the case based on either issues of fact or law. That is, the parties agree to facts and those facts point to a clear winner of the case when the correct laws are applied. Summary judgment helps cases move quickly through the judicial process because an actual trial is not necessary. However, where there are issues of factual disputes or the evidence is unclear, summary judgment cannot be used to conclude the case.

Often, both sides will move for summary judgment because any grant of summary judgment will conclude the case and avoid a full trial. A case appealed from Lafayette, Louisiana, explains when summary judgment is appropriate. The court explains that the burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment. However, that burden adjusts depending on who would be the party needing to prove the burden at actual trial. As a general notion, the burden is usually on the party who is claiming the error. For example, if you are injured in a car accident, then you must prove that the other party was at fault in order to recover. If the mover would not have had the burden at trial, then the threshold to grant summary judgment is much lower. Instead of proving that there is no way the other side could win, the party without the burden could prove that the other party does not have enough facts, evidence, or there is some other fatal flaw with their argument.

In that case, the plaintiff was in a car accident that caused him serious back injuries. His back injuries resulted in surgery and completely inhibited his ability to work. In fact, the plaintiff was a lawyer who previously had his own law practice, but the law practice closed after his accident because he could not continue due to his injuries. The lawyer had two disability policies that covered him should he become disabled and unable to continue working. These polices both had partial options that would award partial benefits if the individual could continue working, but not at full capacity. Since the lawyer had to quit his law practice, he argued that he should be awarded full disability payments.

Both sides argued for summary judgment. The lawyer argued for summary judgment based on the notion that he should be paid the full amount of disability and his payments should have occurred much sooner than they did. The insurance company, on the other hand, argued that summary judgment for their side was appropriate because the lawyer did not deserve full disability and they could not have given payments any sooner because the lawyer did not furnish them with all of the information they needed to begin making payments.

The disability payments depended a great deal on past income. The payments were adjusted to portions of income depending on whether the individual was awarded full or partial disability. As such, the insurance carriers required the lawyer to submit previous tax returns as proof of income. The insurance company requested the plaintiff’s 1999 tax return, but did not receive it until 2005. Instead, the plaintiff furnished the insurance company with his tax returns from 1997 and 1998. Since the accident occurred in 1998 and the payments were to be based on the previous year’s earnings, the plaintiff assumed that the insurance company would want previous year’s tax returns.

While the insurance company was waiting on the 1999 tax return, the insurance company made two payments to the plaintiff. However, the insurance company alleges that they did not pay in full because they did not have the 1999 tax return. The court noticed this inconsistency. The court explained that the plaintiff was obviously entitled to some benefit since the insurance company paid him, but the question was whether the payments were correct and timely. Since the facts did not line up with the testimony, the court determined that neither side should be awarded summary judgment. Accordingly, the case will go to trial and the court will determine the case on the merits, instead of just as a matter of law.

Summary judgment is a valuable tool when used properly. It avoids the time and money involved in a complete trial and allows the winning party to obtain the same result that they likely would have at trial. It functions as a legal short cut. The Berniard Law firm can help determine if your case is appropriate for summary judgment. In addition, we can also take your case to trial if needed.

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The Federal National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) is a federal program that allows homeowners to protect against flooding because most homeowners insurance does not cover flooding (You can check out their website here). It is offered to homeowners, renters and some business owners. The federal government works with private insurance companies to encourage them to offer insurance. The government sets a standard rate and then the insurance is actually through the private insurance company, but involves the federal government to a great degree. The federal government underwrites, or supports the insurance company, but the private insurance company does all of the related administrative tasks.

Because of the federal government’s involvement, when there are issues with the insurance company, you must follow unique litigation paths in order to recover for any damages in many occasions. For example, the federal government will normally cover any litigation costs for the private insurance company. As such, some procedures that would normally be acceptable at the state level may not be allowed in the federal court.

A case in Mississippi that was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals helps explain these differences. In that case, Grissom, the insured individual, had insurance under the NFIP through Liberty Mutual. He was eligible for a preferred risk insurance policy, but did not know he was eligible. After Hurricane Katrina, he argued that he would have purchased the preferred risk insurance policy if he had known about his eligibility.

Even in 2012, issues regarding Hurricane Katrina, which occurred in 2005, are still prevalent. Insurance companies are particularly affected by Katrina, and they are still attempting to sort out many claims. Some of the contract claims that are still moving through the courts are somewhat unique. For example, contracts occasionally have provisions where both parties can appoint an appraiser if the two parties cannot decide how much damage actually occurred. The insurance policies will only insure up to a certain amount, of course, but determining the amount of damage is a vital part of reimbursement of the claim.

An apartment building in Metairie, Louisiana carried insurance that had such an appraisal policy. The contract explained that both parties were to appoint their own appraiser, who is supposed to be fair and impartial. Then, a third individual, the umpire, would be appointed. The umpire takes both of the appraisers’ estimates, examines them, and then comes up with a third number that will be the final number for total damage. The two parties are supposed to appoint the umpire as well, but if the two parties cannot decide on an umpire, then the court can appoint one for them.

In this case, the court did appoint an umpire. However, the court not only appointed an umpire, but also imposed certain rules and restrictions to the appraisal process. In particular, the court restricted the documents that the umpire could receive and required that if the umpire needed to communicate with either party then the opposing party would also be included in the conversation. The communication issues required the umpire to copy both parties on e-mails, letters, and make conference calls. Communication with just one party was strictly not allowed. In addition, neither party was to give the umpire documentation of a legal nature that would attempt to convince the umpire that the award should be a certain amount. Instead, the documentation was limited to receipts, inspections, and other impartial information.

The apartment’s appraiser valued the damage at approximately $200,000, but the insurance company’s appraiser valued the damage at zero. The apartment owner argued that the insurance company’s appraiser was not being impartial because they did not award any damages. However, the insurance company noticed that the apartment owners had already fixed most of the damage using funds from other insurance companies, so the insurance company’s appraiser determined that the apartment owners were not entitled to any more damage payments.

The umpire agreed with the insurance company’s appraiser and recommended that the damage award be zero. Naturally, the apartment owner was upset by this result, so he appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the State of Louisiana. The apartment owner argued that the court interfered too much with the process–the apartment owner should have been able to give the umpire whatever documentation they wanted and communicated however they wanted.

The Court disagreed. It began its analysis by underscoring that although the two parties had an appraisal clause in their contract, the clause does not take away the court’s right to hear a case. In addition, insurance policies are contracts, and should be interpreted under the regular principles of contracts. Therefore, the court will interpret the contract using its regular meaning unless some of the phrases have gained technical definitions in that particular line of business.

The Court explained that the two parties deliberately involved the court when they stated in the contract that the court was to assign an umpire if the two parties could not agree to one. The appraisal portion of the contract did not set specific guidelines in the process, so the court stepped in to create them. The lower court explained that they were afraid the umpire was getting far too much irrelevant information, so they intervened. The Court deemed this a completely acceptable practice under the circumstances. The Court also decided that the insurance company’s appraiser was sufficiently impartial. Lastly, the Court concluded that since the lower court acted appropriately, the award of zero damages should still stand.

This case illustrates a unique clause that could potentially be helpful for the insured, but since the clause was not detailed enough to limit the court’s actions, it turned out to be detrimental.

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NOLA 180 (“NOLA”), a non-profit corporation, was the manager of Langston Hughes Academy Charter School. Kelly Thompson, the Financial Officer of Langston Hughes, was found guilty in federal court of embezzling $667,000 from NOLA, in order to finance her gambling habit. Subsequently, NOLA filed suit against Jazz Casino, alleging that it “substantially participated in and facilitated the gambling obsession of Thompson, and at times materially assisted, encouraged, and otherwise aided and abetted Thompson in the gambling obsession that led to Thompson’s theft.” NOLA also alleged that Jazz Casino “encourag[ed] and/or contribut[ed] to the financial loss suffered by NOLA.” The trial court, The Civil District Court from the Orleans Parish, heard the case. The trial court ruled that NOLA failed to state a right of action or cause of action and dismissed all of NOLA’s claims.

NOLA appealed, and the appellate court, The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit of Louisiana, heard the case. On appeal, the sole issue was whether NOLA’s petition and amended petition stated a cause of action or a right of action against Jazz Casino. On appeal, NOLA asserted three theories for which it could be entitled to relief: it claimed relief under La. Civ. Code art. 2315 for general negligence; under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”); or under the “abuse of rights” doctrine, see Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,344 So.2d 1353 (La. 1976).

Unfortunately for NOLA, not all of those theories could be reviewed. First, NOLA never presented any claims pursuant to LUTPA before the trial court. Appellate courts are limited to reviewing only what is in the record; therefore, the LUTPA claim could not be reviewed. Second, NOLA’s “abuse of rights” doctrine claim, also could not be reviewed. It was not mentioned in NOLA’s petition or amended petition. “That argument is first made in NOLA 180’s opposition memorandum filed in the trial court.” The Court of Appeals noted that “This court is a court of record and can only review what is contained in the record on review.” The Court stated,”We note also that large portions of plaintiff’s brief alluding to research, psychiatric findings, and compulsive gambling, are not contained in the record.”

Licensed attorneys in New Orleans were asked which attorney they would recommend to residents in the New Orleans area. Attorney Jeffrey Berniard, of the New Orleans-based Berniard Law Firm, LLC, was named one of the best mass litigation and class action attorneys in New Orleans in the November 2012 issue of the magazine. Propelled into success by holding insurance companies accountable in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Berniard has built the Berniard Law Firm into one of the premiere personal injury law practices in not only New Orleans, but the entire state of Louisiana. Since Hurricane Katrina, Berniard Law Firm has focused on insurance disputes and class action litigation.

Jeffrey Berniard has been involved in several high-profile cases, solidifying his expertise in complex high risk litigation. He worked on the highly publicized Deep Water Horizon oil rig case in the Gulf Coast, representing a very large group of individuals affected by the sinking oil rig. In 2008, Berniard Law Firm secured a $35 million dollar settlement for a class of 70,000 members seeking bad faith penalties for tardy payments by a Louisiana insurance company in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. In 2009, the Berniard Law Firm participated in five class actions against insurance companies and corporations. In the process of these major claims, the firm also helped many residents of the Gulf Coast with their personal injury concerns, insurance claims and business disputes.

– What is Mass Tort Litigation? –

In the first year of law school, nearly every student takes a course in Contracts. Contract law is one of the bases of our legal system and is at the core of almost all legal agreements. Everytime you get car insurance, sign a lease, agree to pay your plumber or electrician for work, or sign up for new cellphone service, you are dealing with a contract.

In contracts, every single word and punctuation mark is important. Clear, concise and unambiguous language is vital to writing a good contract. Sometimes even big companies enter into contracts that contain ambiguous language. These ambiguities can cause legal problems down the road. The case of WH Holdings, L.L.C. et al. v. ACE American Insurance Company illustrates how ambiguous contract language can lead to legal problems for the parties involved.

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, WH Holdings, the owner of the Ritz Carlton Hotel Complex in New Orleans, hired Gootee Construction Company to renovate the existing structure of the complex. Gootee was in the process of performing the renovations when Hurricane Katrina made landfall and caused damage to the exterior of the building. WH Holdings filed suit against Gootee’s insurer, ACE American Insurance Company, for almost $3.3 million for damage to the exterior of the hotel.
The parties agreed that the contract was governed by a form document known as the General Conditions of the Contract for Construction (General Conditions). The General Conditions is a document that contains amendments that the parties negotiated themselves – the Court acknowledges that these amendments are clearly marked in the document.

Both parties also agreed that WH Holdings was only covered under the policy which ACE issued to Gootee if, and only if, WH Holdings qualified as an insured party under the policy. Thus the entire case rested on whether or not Gootee was “contractually obligated… to insure WH Holdings such that it became an insured on the ACE policy.”

To reach its decision, the District Court looked at two clauses of the contract, Subsections 11.4.1 and 11.1.5(g). The parties distinctly amended a portion of Subsection 11.4.1. to seemingly place the responsibility of purchasing property insurance on Gootee. The District Court even acknowledged that if 11.4.1 stood alone, ACE would have no basis to contest WH Holdings claim. However, the District Court held that a separate subsection, 11.1.5(g), located in a different portion of the contract, changed the meaning of 11.4.1 by “unambiguously… obligating WH Holdings to carry the insurance ‘when the construction is an addition or a renovation.'”
The district court granted ACE’s motion for summary judgment and concluded that WH Holdings was not an insured party under the contract and Gootee had no responsibility to insure WH Holdings.

The 5th Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s analysis stating that while the district court “relied entirely on subsection 11.1.5(g) in finding the contract unambiguous… subsection 11.1.5(g) is not as ‘crystal clear’ as the district court thought it to be.” The Court goes on to point out that 11.1.5(g) appeared in an entirely different portion of the contract than 11.4.1. Subsection 11.1.5(g) appeared in a section of the contract covering “Contractor’s Liability Insurance” while 11.4.1 appeared in a section entitled “Property Insurance.” The Court found that 11.1.5(g) is limited in scope by a preceding clause and therefore does not modify 11.4.1, and to read it any other way would be ignoring this express limit. The 5th Circuit finally stated that it simply cannot agree with Gootee’s assertion and the District Court’s conclusion that the contract language unambiguously obligated WH Holdings to purchase property insurance.

The 5th Circuit also disagreed with WH Holdings argument that it was in fact Gootee who was “unambiguously required… to purchase the property insurance” since WH Holdings was unable to persuasively argue their interpretation. Stating that there were “difficulties with each party’s contention that the contract unambiguously supports its position,” the 5th Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case back to the District Court. Finally, due to the ambiguous nature of the contract, the 5th Circuit also ordered the District Court to examine outside evidence brought by both parties regarding the meaning of the contract and to examine how both parties had performed the contract prior to the lawsuit being brought.

Contracts can be extremely important and very complicated particularly when dealing with insurance issues. Hiring the proper attorney is very important to ensure that all documents relevant are maintained, and provided, from start to finish, as well as to navigate any complicated appeals that may arise.

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In Jane Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC arising out of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a class action suit was filed involving a local branch of the national gym, Anytime Fitness, was accused of taking pictures of 250-300 women changing in a locker room. The plaintiffs filed on behalf of all women who’d used the gym during the time period and the class was certified to proceed to trial.

To understand what “the class was certified” means, it is important to understand what a class action suit is the reasons why we allow class actions in the first place. Class action suits are a useful tool in litigation in that it can bring together large numbers of substantially similar or identical claims into a single proceeding. This contributes to judicial efficiency as often times the type of cases litigated as class actions can have as many as thousands of plaintiffs. Assuming each of these cases was large enough to be worth bringing to court individually, there would be substantial amounts of duplicated effort by each party. However, the real value of class actions is in allowing cases that normally would be too small to litigate individually to have their day in court. If a case involves a real injustice to thousands of people, but the actual per person damages is relatively small it would be too costly to vindicate their claims.

In this case, the class proposed was:

all females who physically entered the women’s restroom/locker room/ changing room at Anytime Fitness, 200 Government Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802 from November 1, 2009, through and including April 5 2010.

The rules that govern class actions require that several hurdles be met before a class can be certified (allowed) to proceed: there must be enough members that litigating separately is impractical; the questions of law and facts in the case common to the parties; the class representative’s claims must be typical of the claims of the class; they are able to protect the interests of the entire class, and finally the class must be able to be adequately defined so the court can be satisfied that the suit will end the dispute.

This case is noteworthy because the actual size of the class is fairly small. The gym operator admitted to videotaping on only 10-15 occasions. While any number of women may have been victims during these periods, the class itself was certified for any woman using the gym during a nearly 6 month period. There is no rule that states the minimum number of plaintiffs required for a class action, but the appeals court did not give a rousing endorsement for the “numerosity” (size) of the class in this case, they merely deferred to the trial court judgment on the matter. What was particularly noteworthy was the court weighed concerns beyond just the actual numbers of women involved. An additional factor was evidence that the gym allowed members from around the country to use it and thus the plaintiffs might not all have been locals which would have substantially increased the burden to litigate separately. Had all the women been locals, it is possible the court would have required “joinder” or just combining separate cases rather than allowing a representative in a class action suit.

Most people have been involved in a class action suit and may not have even been aware of it. Generally, each member of the class is required to be notified to give them the opportunity to opt-out of (or into) the class. This will typically be done via a postcard by mail. Thousands of these cards are thrown away without being read yearly but they can entitle plaintiffs to small to moderate cash settlements without ever setting foot in a courtroom, as you are being represented by the person bringing the suit!

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