Articles Posted in Legal Definitions

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Regardless of your level of legal training, we’re all guilty of ignoring the fine print but insurance coverage is often determined by the placement of an unnoticed word or punctuation mark in the language of the policy. Under Louisiana law, the insured bears the burden of proving that an incident falls within the terms of the policy. In contrast, an insurer seeking to avoid coverage through a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of proving that a provision or exclusion precludes coverage. Courts treat insurance policies like other contracts and therefore strive to interpret each term according to its true meaning. As straightforward as it sounds, a contract’s true meaning is always disputed even if on its face the language appears clear. This requires courts to hear creative arguments on the meaning of particular terms buried in the policy.

On June 8, 2010, in an unfortunate incident at the Library Lounge in Monroe, McKenzie A. Hudson (Mr. Hudson) was approached by an intoxicated patron and struck in the head. In December 2010, Mr. Hudson died from severe brain injuries allegedly suffered during the attack. Mr. Hudson’s mother filed a wrongful death/survival suit against several defendants including the entity that owned the bar as well as its principals. Several weeks later Ms. Hudson added First Financial Insurance Company (FFIC), insurer of the bar.

Recognizing the language of the bar’s insurance policy, Ms. Hudson admitted that her son’s assailant did not intend or expect her son’s death but instead it resulted when he lost consciousness, fell to the pavement, and fractured his skull. The particular provision at issue in the policy read that it did not provide coverage for assault, battery, or other physical altercation. The policy defined assault in part as “a willful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon another” and battery as “wrongful physical contact with a person without his or her consent that entails some injury or offensive touching.”

Ms. Hudson differentiated between the FFIC’s old policy language which was ambiguous as to “extraordinary” injuries and its current policy which included amendments intended to broaden and clarify exclusions. Ms. Hudson specifically pointed to the removal of an “or” between the assault and battery provisions which had the effect of causing the provisions to be read together. This eliminated coverage for all “intended” or “expected” injuries. Since her son was not intentionally killed or expected to die she argued coverage should be provided. In response, FFIC submitted numerous cases where similar assault and battery exclusions were upheld.

Like the trial court, the court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of FFIC for several reasons. First, the court reviewed the cases submitted by the FFIC and concluded that the “overwhelming” majority of insurers were dismissed from suits arising from injury or death after an assault or battery. Furthermore, the court pointed to a similar case where it was determined that the presence of an “and” or “or” did not necessarily indicate that the provisions should or should not be read together. The court concluded that the provisions were clear in their language and that there was no question Mr. Hudson was the victim of battery. Therefore, the policy excluded insurance coverage for his death.

Although the courts demonstrate a reluctance to rule against the insurance companies in policy exclusion cases this does not mean a particular result is guaranteed. The terms of each insurance policy varies and requires careful review of its language before any legal action is taken.

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Defendant Robert Turnage was in an accident with Plaintiffs Heather and Nicholas Tate on Memorial Day 2011 on Louisiana Highway 28 East, in Pineville. Tate attempted to pull out of a McDonald’s parking lot when she was struck my Turnage’s vehicle. Tate filed a petition for damages and the trial court found Tate to be 10% liable and Turnage to be 90% liable, awarding general, special and property damages to Heather Tate, along with general and special damages to her son Nicholas. Turnage appealed this judgment.

Turnage brought up 4 issues in his appeal: 1. The Plaintiff was essentially free from fault and met the heightened burden of proof imposed upon left-turning motorists from private driveway; 2. The Plaintiff preempted the Defendant’s right-of-way, although the accident did not occur at an intersection; That Defendant was 90% at fault, although the Court found credible his testimony that he did not motion to the Plaintiff that the way was clear for her to cross the highway; 4. The Plaintiff was 10% at fault in causing the Accident.

The standard of review for the appellate court is based on precedent, or previous case law, that sets for the amount of deference that the appellate court has in ruling the trial court’s initial decision. The appellate court is bound by the precedent that states:

“a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong…the court of appeal may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.”

The appellate court in this case has a higher standard of review in that they cannot reverse the decision based on small differences they perceived in the facts that the trial court ruled on, but can only rule differently if the original fact finder ruled in error or the ruling is completely wrong.

Turnage testified that he left a “gap” while sitting at a red light outside of the McDonald’s that Tate was pulling out of. Tate claimed that Turnage waved her forward to make the left turn she was waiting to make out of the private parking lot, but Turnage denies this, which the trial court found to be irrelevant. Louisiana Revised Statute 32:104(A) requires that a turning vehicle must not enter the roadway “unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety” and that La.R.S. 32:124 requires that a motorist entering a highway from a private road or driveway “yield the right of way to all approaching vehicles so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.” Although Tate is held to this standard, as soon as Turnage left the gap for Tate to pull out he no longer was in favor and he needed to exercise with caution by looking both way, which he states he failed to do. The appellate court found no error in the trial court ruling and that the fact that Tate almost completed the left hand turn before being hit only makes it more evident that Turnage proceeded unlawfully.

The appellate court disagreed with Turnage’s arguments that Tate failed to meet the burden of extreme care, that the trial court relied on Tate’s testimony that Turnage signaled her to pull through, and that the trial court abused its discretion in saying that Turnage was 90% at fault. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling and all costs of appeal were assessed to Robert Turnage and Southern Casualty Insurance Co.

If you ever experience a similar situation or are involved in a car accident contact the Berniard Law Firm.

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In April 2010, an offshore drilling rig, the Deepwater Horizon, exploded and sank into the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven workers died and crude oil from the well spilled into the Gulf for months after the accident. The result was a mass of litigation involving multiple defendants. In order to deal with the extensive facts and individuals involved in this case, like many other cases, the parties can appeal just one issue of the case if the lower court denies or grants a judgment on that particular issue.

Normally, a decision must be a final one in order to be appealed. That generally means that the case has concluded and the lower court has rendered a judgment. That way, the appeals court considers all of the facts involved, but can still allow the lower court to do most of the fact analysis. However, there are some occasions where an appeal on just one issue is allowed. This is known as an interlocutory appeal, and it falls under the collateral order doctrine. The collateral order doctrine assumes that some decisions are “final in effect although they do not dispose of the litigation.”

In order to use the collateral order doctrine, the lower court must have 1) conclusively determined the disputed question, 2) resolved an important issue that is completely separate from the final decision in the case, and 3) the issue must also be effectively unreviewable on appeal in a final judgment. “Effectively unreviewable” means that the court of appeals will have no way to review the decision of the lower court once the lower court makes a decision on this particular issue. Generally, if the decision could be appealed in some other way than the interlocutory appeal, then the court will not use the interlocutory appeal.

In the oil spill case, parties assumed that one worker in particular held a great deal of information because he was the BP Well Site Leader on duty aboard the rig at the time of the accident. However, the Site Leader had an undisclosed medical condition that prohibited him from testifying or answering written questions. The Site Leader explained his medical condition to the judge on two separate occasions, but did not disclose the information to the parties.

Since the parties believed that he was such a valuable witness, they really wanted to obtain information from him. As such, another judge ordered an independent doctor to examine him and ordered the Site Leader to produce his medical records to the independent doctor. The Site Leader protested because he was concerned about sharing his personal information. This order is a discovery decision, and discovery decisions are appealable after the final decision of the court based on the use of inadmissible evidence.

One of the Site Leader’s major arguments, however, was that releasing his personal medical information would cause a great deal of harm to him personally, and there is no method on appeal to reverse that type of harm. Nonetheless, the court determined that district courts can “burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of the final district court judgment.” Therefore, even though there may be harm that cannot be reversed for the Site Leader, the court will still allow the medical information to come in because the final verdict could change on appeal if the information is removed later. To use another example, the court explains that even if the information is privileged, that does not make it appropriate for an interlocutory appeal.

The court only briefly considered the rights of the Site Leader and his concern about protecting his personal information. In that discussion, they explain that they weighed the costs of sharing his information with the benefits of having his testimony at trial and determined that the benefits outweighed the costs.

As result, the court determined that it could not use the collateral order doctrine and that the interlocutory appeal was inappropriate. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and allowed the bulk of the case to continue in the lower court.

Civil procedure issues can be a delicate balance between protecting the case and protecting the individuals involved in the case.

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La. R.S. 30:29 (“Act 312”) was in enacted in 2006 and became effective in June of that year. Act 312 provides a procedure for the remediation of oil field sites as well as oil exploration and production sites. Generally, remediation is “the action of remedying something, in particular of reversing or stopping environmental change.” Before the Louisiana legislature enacted Act 312, most remediation requirements were through private party contracts; therefore, Act 312 did not change the normal trial procedures established by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently discussed Act 312 at length, explaining what it did change, in a case involving the Vermilion Parish School Board. The Court explained that Act 312 was enacted because of serious concerns with the state of the land and ground water after an area was used for oil exploration and production. Parties would use the land and ground water under a mineral lease for several years, and leave the property in terrible shape by the time that they were done. Mineral leases allow the parties to contract for only the minerals or the potential oil that is located on that property. The party with the mineral lease, then, does not rent the entire property, but just the ability to find minerals or oil within or upon that property.

Before Act 312, parties could still sue if one party left the land in terrible shape. Occasionally, however, it does not make sense economically to force a party to fix the land they damaged. Instead, the renting party would have to give the “landlord” the difference between the value of the land when they received it and the value of the land when it was returned after the lease, under a tort law theory. However, the person who owned the land, the “landlord,” was not required to use the funds to fix damage done to the land. As a result, property that had serious environmental problems often went without remediation because the landlord was not required to fix it. This creates health and safety concerns for the general public.

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In January, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered an appeal from the Vermilion Parish School Board. The appeal centered on environmental damage to land that was subject to a mineral lease. The mineral lease allowed those leasing the land to look for and remove any mineral, including oil, that they found on the land. However, once they did this, they left the land in a state that was environmentally hazardous.

Louisiana has special procedures for dealing with restoring land so that we do not harm the environment, specifically when removing oil. The remediation of the land, this restoring process, was one of the major issues in the Vermilion Parish case. The defendants included Union Oil Company of California, Union Exploration Partners, Carrollton Resources, LLC, Chevron USA, Inc., and Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.

The Court faced two major issues in this case. The first was whether the parties could receive damages in excess of the amount it would take to restore the property, thereby correcting the environmental damage. The Court determined that the language of the legislation (La. R.S. 30:29) was clear and that the parties could receive a larger amount.

Under Louisiana law, when a case arises where a party is required to correct an environmental wrong, the funds are deposited into the court’s registry. The court will then disperse the funds to repair the land. This is a relatively new development because this act was put into effect in 2006. The legislature was concerned that parties who received funds to help correct the damage done to their land would not use it for that purpose if they were not so required. Leaving property that is damaged could create serious issues for the health, safety, and welfare of the surrounding population.

The legislation focuses on the role of the fact finder in determining whether there was environmental damage, and how much that environmental damage will cost to fix. As such, the court determined that the case should continue so that the fact finder could make those determinations.

The second issue was whether Chevron should be dismissed from the case. According to the facts, Union Oil had the mineral lease first, but Chevron subsequently acquired Union Oil and all of their assets, including the lease. As such, Chevron became responsible for any environmental damage that Union Oil may have caused. Chevron admitted responsibility initially, but then denied that they should be legally responsible later.

Chevron explained that while Chevron Corp. owns both Chevron USA and Union Oil Company of California, the two sections do not overlap. That is, Union Oil had $18 billion in assets, and should they be found liable for environmental damage, the amount that they will pay will come from their assets and not Chevron’s. Chevron explained that those assets were never transferred out of Union Oil, so Union Oil remained somewhat independent even after Chevron acquired them.

Therefore, Chevron argued that Chevron USA should be removed from the case so that those assets are not adversely affected. Nonetheless, Frank Soler, the senior liaison in the subsidiary governance unit of the corporate governance department for Chevron Corp. admitted that Union Oil does not have any employees and there may be service agreements between the two sections for day-to-day activities.

The Plaintiffs in the case were only allowed to discover a very limited amount of information from Chevron regarding this case. The court restricted the information until they determined whether or not Chevron should remain in the case a defendant. As such, many facts remained unknown regarding the relationship between Chevron and Union Oil. Therefore, the court determined that Plaintiffs should be allowed to gather more information and the case should continue.

Both of these issues failed the summary judgment test. The test is whether there is an absence of material facts in the case. If there is such an absence, then the court will only determine the questions of law and one side will receive a summary judgment. In this case, however, the court determined that there may be facts in dispute because they did not have enough information; therefore, the case continued.

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In Louisiana, a merchant’s duty to keep the premises safe for its customers is narrowly defined by the law. La. R.S. 9:2800.6 specifically deals with merchants and requires the injured party to prove:

(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.

(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence.

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Angela Terrell was driving her employer’s van when she was injured in a vehicle collision on U.S. Highway 190 in Pointe Coupee Parish on Mach 5th of 2010. Ms. Terrell filed a lawsuit against the other driver and his insurance provider for damages and later amended her lawsuit to also include her employer’s van’s insurance provider, ACE, to force ACE to cover any of her damages that were in excess of the other driver’s insurance policy. In Terrell v. Fontenot the Louisiana Court of Appeals ruled that ACE did not need to cover any excess damages because the van’s policy holder properly rejected the uninsured/underinsured provision of the insurance agreement.

Insurance providers typically offer their customers uninsured or underinsured insurance coverage, also called UM coverage. If an insurance provider provides UM coverage to its client the insurance provider may need to pay for any damages the customer sustained in a vehicle accident if the other driver was both at fault and uninsured or underinsured. UM coverage in an individual’s insurance policy can work as a safeguard against the individual having to pay for his own damages out-of-pocket if an uninsured or underinsured driver causes an accident with the individual.

Louisiana does not require a driver to have UM coverage, but a handful of states do. Because Louisiana does have a strong public policy favoring UM coverage, UM coverage is implied in automobile insurance policies, even if UM coverage is not explicitly listed in the insurance contract. The only time in Louisiana that UM coverage will not be read into an automobile insurance policy is when the customer has clearly and unambiguously rejected the coverage. The insurance provider has the burden of proof to prove that the rejection was sufficiently clear.

The court in Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co. established the criteria for properly rejecting UM coverage: (1) initialing the rejection of UM coverage; (2) filling in the amount of coverage selected for each person and accident if the a limit lower than the policy limit is chosen; (3) printing the name of the insured or legal representative; (4) signing the corresponding signature; (5) filling in the policy number; and (6) filling in the date.

Ms. Terrell later amended her suit to also include the van’s insurance provider, ACE, so that if the other driver was later found to be at fault and did not have sufficient cash or insurance to pay all of her damages then ACE, through its UM coverage, would become liable for any remaining damages. The crux of the case, therefore, is whether the van’s ACE insurance policy includes UM coverage.

The court sided with ACE insurance in holding that the van’s insurance policy did not include UM coverage because the owner of the van properly rejected ACE’s UM coverage option. The owner of the van that Ms. Terrell was driving was a corporation— Professional Transportation, Inc. (PTI), a company that leased the vehicle from another owner.

The owner of the van, PTI, is a corporation and is unable to act on its own behalf. Instead PTI acts on its own behalf as all corporations do: by authorizing individuals to act on behalf of the corporation. That’s exactly what happened here. The owner of PTI verbally authorized one of its employees to obtain insurance and sign insurance forms. The court agreed with ACE that because that employee clearly and unambiguously rejected the van’s UM coverage ACE is not responsible for any UM insurance.

Ms. Terrell argued that although PTI’s employee rejected the UM coverage according to the above criteria for proper rejection, the rejection was invalid because PTI never properly authorized the employee to obtain insurance on its behalf. The court sided against Ms. Terrell because Louisiana’s Revised Statute 22:1295 makes clear that the insured or his legal representative can reject UM coverage. Here PTI’s employee was PTI’s legal representative, and Ms. Terrell was unable to convince the court that PTI had to do more than verbally authorize its employee to act on its behalf.

Because the owner of the van properly rejected the UM coverage, Ms. Terrell faces an uphill challenge if the Defendant is uninsured or underinsured and unable to pay all of her damages.

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Although the law requires that all motorists obtain liability coverage, when pressed with financial difficulty and confronted with rising insurance premiums, some individuals voluntarily accept the risk of large fines and choose to forego liability insurance. Despite all attempts at exercising reasonable care, a fraction of these drivers inevitably end up causing accidents. And when they do, the lack of resources that led them to risk driving without insurance becomes the problem of the other driver who cannot recover for personal injury or property damage resulting from the accident.

This scenario led many states, Louisiana among them, to enact laws designed to encourage motorists to obtain Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage. The State of Louisiana is among the most aggressive in encouraging uninsured motorist coverage. Louisiana law requires that all policies contain underinsured/uninsured motorist coverage sufficient to pay damages for bodily injuries resulting from an accident. This is known as Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage (“UMBI”). In addition to the required UMBI coverage, insurers offer Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Property Damage Coverage (“UMPD”).

Under Louisiana law, therefore, all policies implicitly contain UMBI coverage unless the insured specifically “rejects” such coverage pursuant to a state-prescribed form. Even in states permitting the insurer to draft the UMBI waiver form, courts have developed a policy of construing these documents strictly against the drafter, in order to promote the public policy of obtaining such coverage.

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The case of American Zurich Insurance v. Caterpillar arose from a truck fire that took place in Natchitoches Parish on April 7, 2010. American Zurich insured the truck and Caterpillar manufactured the truck’s engine. American Zurich opened up a loss file on the truck the day of the fire. American Zurich paid out almost $77,000 dollars to the insured.

On April 26, 2010, Zurich was informed of a possible defect in the engine by an inspection agency they hired to look into the claim. A year later, on April 26, 2011, American Zurich filed suit against Caterpillar in West Baton Rouge Parish seeking reimbursement for the costs they incurred, but the case was subsequently moved to Natchitoches Parish in June 2011. On November 10, 2011, the trial court granted Caterpillar’s peremptory exception of prescription and their motion for summary judgment and dismissed American Zurich’s claims. American Zurich appealed the trial court’s decision and the case made its way to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal. While you read the rest of this case summary, keep the dates mentioned above in mind.

So why does keeping these dates straight in our minds matter, and what is a peremptory exception of prescription? Actions brought under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, or LPLA, must be filed within one year “from the day injury or damage is sustained.” This one year time period is known as a prescriptive period. A peremptory exception of prescription is a defense motion arguing that the plaintiff has no case because they failed to file their case in the required prescriptive period of time. So one of the major issues in this case became on what date did that prescriptive period begin? Caterpillar claimed it started on April 7, 2010, the day of the fire. American Zurich claimed it began on April 26, 2010, which was the day their investigators told them about the engine defect.

The court noted that “prescription begins to run when the defect manifests itself, not on the date the underlying cause of the defect is found.” In other words, the court said that the one year prescriptive period began on the day of the fire, April 7, 2010. The court points out that American Zurich knew about the fire the day it occurred, and therefore, American Zurich had no basis for arguing that the prescriptive date should have started on April 26, 2010. Thus the court holds that American Zurich did not file their case within the one year prescriptive period required under the LPLA which ran out on April 7, 2011.

The court also quickly dispatched a breach of contract claim by American Zurich. American Zurich claimed that by building a defective engine, Caterpillar had failed to perform under their service contract. In Louisiana, the LPLA is the sole remedy against a manufacturer of a defective product. There is one exception to this rule, and that applies when the damage, or part of the damage, is caused exclusively by a breach of contract, and not the defective product itself. So it was important for American Zurich to argue this exception applied in this case because a breach of contract claim has a prescriptive period of ten years in Louisiana.

The court found American Zurich’s argument unpersuasive since the damage was solely attributable to the defective engine, and their claims were not related to the service contract itself. The exception mentioned above was not applicable, and therefore the LPLA was controlled this case. As mentioned above, the prescriptive period had run out before American Zurich filed their case against Caterpillar, and the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of American Zurich’s claims.
This case shows the vital importance of taking timely action when engaged in legal matters.

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In a recent case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s application of the “law-of-the-case” and “waiver” doctrines. Both of these doctrines are important rules that express the ultimate power of an appellate court in reviewing issues of law. Generally, an issue of law is a question regarding the application of law to a case. Therefore, in pursuing any civil suit, it is imperative to understand the implications and ramifications of an appellate court’s power to change the ruling in your case.

In Bayou Steel Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the Fifth Circuit Court reviewed an insurance dispute that concerned the apportionment of liability for a severe leg injury that was suffered by a worker who was unloading steel bundles. In a complicated fact scenario, Ryan Campbell was injured, in 2002, while unloading steel bundles owned by Bayou Steel Corp. on a barge that was owned by Memco Barge Lines, Inc. Shortly before this incident occurred, Bayou Steel Corp. had contracted with Memco to transport the steel from LaPlace, Louisiana, to Chicago, Illinois. At the time of his injury, Ryan Campbell was working for Kindra Marine Terminal, a stevedoring company that was assigned to unload the steel bundles in Chicago. After the suit involving Ryan Campbell was settled, Bayou Steel Corp. brought suit seeking a declaration of coverage and reimbursement from National Union Fire Insurance.

After a series of appeals, the district court used the law-of-the-case doctrine to determine that Kindra was not a sub-contractor of Bayou Steel. Therefore, Campbell’s injuries fell within the language of the insurance policy that Bayou Steel held. Thus, the lower court entered summary judgment for National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

According to the law-of-the-case doctrine, “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issue in subsequent stages in the same case.” Thus, an issue of law “decided on appeal may not be reexamined by the district court on remand or by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal.” Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that that fact that Campbell did not fall within the exclusion in the policy held by Bayou Steel was part of the law of the case and subsequently held that this issue had been resolved on an earlier appeal.

The waiver doctrine “holds that an issue that could have been raised on appeal but is forfeited and may not be revisited by the district court on remand.” Id. Like the law-of-the-case doctrine, the waiver doctrine “serves judicial economy by forcing parties to raise issues whose resolution might spare the court and parties later rounds of remands and appeals.” However, the waiver doctrine “arises as a consequence of a party’s inaction, [and] not as a consequence of a decision on [the part of the Court of Appeals].” Thus, the Court of Appeals agreed that Bayou had waived their argument about the language of the policy by failing to raise it on remand after the first appeal or during the second appeal … “[b]ecause they failed to raise it during that period, the issue could not [have been] revisited by the district court on remand.”

In its decision, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the lower court had properly applied the law-of-the-case and waiver doctrines and that summary judgment in favor of National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was appropriate.

All of these matters are inherently complicated and show that knowledge of the exact law is necessary to reach a successful outcome. While questions and issues of law must be decided by the court, your legal representative should be aware of the foregoing doctrines and should be able to adequately present your case.

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