Articles Posted in Accidents

Years after Hurricane Rita, which hit in September 2005, those who have had their homes damaged are still dealing with cleaning up the wreckage and rebuilding. Litigation involving insurance companies is still particularly prominent. One couple from Lake Charles, Louisiana knows about this type of litigation all too well.

The couple had homeowners insurance through State Farm and made a claim for damage to their home as result of the storm. State Farm paid them for the damages and they began to rebuild. However, after the claims were settled, the couple found that significant damage to the home’s rafters in the attic. An adjuster came right over and paid the couple for damage to three windows. The rafters, on the other hand, were a different question. There was a separation between the center beam and the rafters that connected to the center beam to support the roof; the center beam was essential to the strength and integrity of the home’s overall structure. State Farm explained that the couple needed to have the opinion of an engineer to support their claim for damage to the rafters.

In Louisiana, like many other states, lay people are generally not allowed to offer their opinions at trial. Instead, they are supposed to supply facts and the jury or judge is supposed to provide their opinion, resulting in the outcome of the trial. The witness should not substitute their opinion for that of the factfinder. However, if the witness is certified as an expert in a particular area, then they can give their opinion to the court.

Testimony of expert witnesses is particularly useful in highly technical trials. For example, if an individual is suing for a personal injury, it may be helpful to have a doctor come in to explain the injury and state how he or she thinks the plaintiff acquired the injury. If you can only acquire the injury a certain way, then the fact finder should know that information so they can provide an accurate final verdict.

In this case, the couple had their contractor come in to testify. Their contractor built the home and testified as to his opinion of how the damage occurred. He was a valuable witness because he could tell the judge that when he built the home, the center beam and rafters were not separated as they are now. He explained that if they were separated like that, then the house would not have been up to code and the couple could not have lived there.

The couple also employed an engineer to testify at the trial regarding the cause of the split in the rafters. The engineer looked at the house after the storm and, using his experience, explained that only extremely high winds could have created that kind of damage in the time between when the house was built and shortly after Hurricane Rita hit. He also stated that the home’s structure would have continued to get worse if the attic frame was not properly restored.

State Farm argued that the contractor was not an appropriate expert because he was not trained to be an expert regarding causation of the movement in the rafters. Because he was not an engineer, he could not compute the effect of the wind speed on the house nearly as well as an engineer could. However, State Farm did not like the engineer that the couple used either. In fact, they argued, the contractor did not even use the correct wind speed when he calculated the effect of the wind, so his testimony should be entirely discredited.

The court determined that both the contractor’s and the engineer’s testimony would remain in evidence. First, it concluded that the contractor was not retained as an expert for the trial, so he did not need to be qualified as an expert. Instead, he spoke about the before and after affects regarding the rafters. Louisiana law allows witnesses who are not experts to testify about their inferences and opinions if they are “rationally based upon the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of [the] testimony or determination of the fact at issue.” In addition, the court kept the engineer’s testimony because they determined that even though he had used the incorrect wind speed in his calculations, the correct wind speed would not have changed the outcome of his opinion.

Witnesses can make or break a case, and expert witnesses are particularly important to explain technical concepts that the average person may not understand. Those technical concepts are usually essential to the case.

Continue reading

In a suit by a commercial tenant and their insurance company against the landlord, Mr. Ducet, the landlord defended by arguing that the terms of the lease prevented the tenant from recovering damages. If the tenant was unable to recover damages the insurance company would also be unable to recover under the legal concept of subrogation.

The lease clause in question was called a mutual waiver. In it the parties agreed not to bring claims against each other for damages as a result of a fire if the damages were or could have been insured against under a typical fire insurance policy. The lease also stated that the landlord and the renter would each get a waiver of subrogation from their respective insurance underwriters. Subrogation is when an insurance company pays their policy holder the cost to repair or replace the damaged property but then sues the person who caused the damage or is otherwise legally responsible for it to get the money back from them. The Court found that the waiver in the lease prevented the tenant’s insurance company from suing the landlord for the amount the company had paid the tenant for damaged personal property and equipment. The Court stated that the insurance company, as subrogee, had no greater rights than the tenant. Under the mutual waiver provision in the lease agreement the tenant had no right to sue the landlord for the cost of personal property or equipment lost in a fire, therefore the insurance company could have no right to sue either.

Another issue in the case was how the mutual waiver affected other responsibilities under the contract. The tenant arranged to have the roof repaired after the fire even though under the terms of the lease the landlord was responsible for repairing any damage done to the building itself as a result of a fire. The Court found that the landlord had a duty under the contract to keep the building itself in good repair and that it was his responsibility to repair the roof after the fire. The fact that the tenant hired someone to fix the roof before the landlord had done it did not relieve the landlord of his obligation. The mutual waiver clause in the lease did not prevent the repair company from suing the landlord for the cost of the repairs which were the landlord’s responsibility.

This case shows how previous contracts, such as a lease, can affect later contracts, like fire insurance policies, even when they are made with third parties. It is important for every property owner and renter to understand how their contracts affect their rights and obligations in regard to their property. This is equally important for business owners as for people dealing with their own homes.

Continue reading

As is often the case, an accident between two vehicles can subsequently involve further vehicles not initially involved in the initial rear-ending accident. The driver of the subsequent vehicle which becomes involved in an accident after the initial crash may be unsure whether they are for damages caused by their own involvement or are able to make a claim for their own damages suffered. The possibility of being responsible or owed for damages in a multiple vehicle accident almost always depends on the circumstances surrounding the driver of the following car involved in the collision after the initial accident.

It is generally presumed under the law the vehicle following other vehicles involved in an accident will be at fault for the resulting accident when it collides with the initial collided vehicles. However, a driver can avoid this presumption of liability if it is shown they were following at a safe distance under the circumstances, their vehicle was under control, and they were closely observing the vehicle ahead of them. There is an additional method of proving no fault for liability referred to as the sudden emergency doctrine. A following driver may be absolved of liability under the sudden emergency doctrine if it is demonstrated the lead driver negligently created a hazard which could not reasonably be avoided. A court is going to look at the circumstances from which the emergency arose and determine whether the person in the position of imminent peril had sufficient time to consider and weigh all circumstances or the best means to adopt to avoid the impending danger of the emergency.

A recent case before the Second Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana, King v. State Farm Insurance Co., succinctly demonstrates the applicability of the sudden emergency doctrine in absolving the following driver from complete liability while awarding the following driver damages for injuries incurred. In this case, Ms. King was following a vehicle which struck another vehicle from the rear. Ms. King then swerved onto the shoulder to avoid the accident. Unfortunately, at the same time Ms. King swerved, the vehicle in front of her bounced to the side of the collision directly into Ms. King’s path on the shoulder where she impacted it. The court looked favorably upon the facts that Ms. King had been traveling beneath the speed limit, was observing the car in front of her, and was at a relatively reasonable behind the lead car. The court found that in addition to this the lead driver had created the emergency situation through his own collision, and Mrs. King had taken reasonable precautions by braking, and steering away from the accident. Despite her precautions, the unexpected turning of the vehicle into her emergency path was something she could not have sufficiently avoided in time. Hence, the court found the lead driver had created a hazard resulting in a Ms. King facing a sudden emergency. The court found the lead driver 100% at fault for the damages and injuries Ms. King suffered as a result of the lead driver’s original collision.

In a case involving liability of parties, the court must assess the relative fault of each of the parties. A following driver will not be responsible for liability under the sudden emergency doctrine, unless their actions caused the emergency. In the example case above, the lead driver was found to have created the emergency, and thus Ms. King was at no fault in the subsequent collision. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana held that the trial court had correctly awarded Ms. King for the damages and injuries she had suffered as a result of the accident.

If you believe you have a claim arising from a multiple vehicle accident, contact the Berniard Law Firm. Providing the best experts in liability and assessing accident claims, our law firm is fully capable of meeting your litigation needs.

Continue reading

In this auto-related blog post, plaintiff Fartima Hawkins seeks to recover damages resulting from a February 5, 2008, automobile accident in Baton Rouge Louisiana. The accident occurred when Ms. Hawkins’ vehicle was broadsided by a government vehicle being driven by Sergeant Sean Fowler, a recruiter for the United States Army. Ms. Hawkins filed suit naming, among others, Sergeant Fowler and his personal liability insurer, Allstate, as defendants

After Hawkins filed suit against them, Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the policy issued to Fowler excluded coverage for the accident. Allstate claimed Fowler lacked permission to use the government vehicle for commuting purposes or, alternatively, because Fowler used the vehicle for his regular use insofar as he drove it back and forth from his home in Baton Rouge to his office in Covington each day. Allstate further asserted that its policy did not afford coverage under either circumstance and summary judgment was therefore appropriate.

The trial granted Allstate summary judgment reasoning that whether Mr. Fowler had implied permission or not, it either falls within the regular use exclusion because back and forth to work every day is regular use or alternatively falls within the lack of permission exclusion. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

What is vicarious liability? Vicarious liability, simply put, is the common law principle that an employer may be liable for its employee’s negligence if that employee’s negligence occurred within the course or scope of his or her employment.

In the Beech v. Hercules Drilling Company, L.L.C., case coming out of the Eastern District of Louisiana, vicarious liability principles came into play. In this case, certain bizarre events led the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to make a ruling as to whether Hercules Drilling Company should be held vicariously liable for the actions of Michael Cosenza, its employee, who accidentally shot and killed his co-worker, Keith Beech, while both were aboard a Hercules owned vessel.

The facts of the case were not in dispute. Beech was a crane operator aboard a jack-up drilling rig that Hercules owned, while Cosenza was a driller aboard the vessel. On December 13, 2009, the fateful events that led to the aforementioned case, took place. Cosenza happened to own a firearm, which he accidentally took aboard the vessel; Hercules policy prohibited any firearms from being aboard their vessels. Not only did Cosenza bring a firearm aboard the vessel, violating the policy, but when he realized that he had inadvertently brought it aboard (he found it among his laundry) he did not inform anyone about it and placed it in his locker, further violating Hercules policy. Cosenza was aware of the policies regarding firearms.

Vehicle collisions are difficult in of themselves but when they involve an insurance dispute, they can be considerably daunting. One recent case involving an accident in dispute helps illustrate this further. In this case, Broussard and Brandy Oppenheimer live together with a child, but are unmarried. Broussard was driving Oppenheimer’s vehicle when he was rear-ended by an uninsured driver. While the pair maintained unisured motorist coverage through their insurance policies, which is suppose to cover them in these types of situations. However, the insurance company saw otherwise.

Farm Bureau denied Broussard’s request, stating that “the policy did not cover the accident in that Broussard was operating a vehicle that was not listed in the policy.” The insurer filed a motion of summary judgment on the issue of coverage, while Broussard filed a cross motion summary judgment to recover under his policy. The Appellate court cited Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University to define summary judgment, which states that a motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

The trial court reasoned that by allowing Farm Bureau “to exclude coverage would allow…a policy in derogation of La.R.S. 22:1295.” The statute explains that the policy should provide coverage to “an injured party while occupying and automobile not owned by said injured party.” Farm Bureau appealed the trial court’s decision to grant Michael Broussard’s motion for summary judgment. The granted motion for summary judgment declared Broussard was entitled to coverage under his uninsured motorist clause in his insurance policy.

To counter, Farm Bureau cited policy language claiming the insuring policy does not apply:

This insuring policy does not apply: (1) to any automobile owned by or furnished for the regular use to either the named insured or a member of the same household.

And;

This policy does not apply: (g) Under division 1 of coverage to bodily injury to the insured, his spouse or members of household sustained while in or entering into or alighting from an automobile owned by the insured, his spouse, or members of the household except the one described in the declarations.

The trial court and the Appellate court both agreed and affirmed that “policy language cannot change the requirements of the statute.” The law would allow the exclusion of coverage if involving a spouse or relative’s policies, but is not the situation here as Broussard and Oppenheimer are not married or related. Farm Bureau’s attempt to push the limits of its restrictions were unsuccessful, however, resulting in the judgment in favor of Broussard.

Continue reading

In a recent case, a federal appeals court ruled on a longshoreman’s right to recover for injuries sustained when a pile-driving hammer unexpectedly released from a crane and fell on him. His employer had leased the crane from another company in order to perform restoration work on the docks and bulkheads at the Turtle Cove Research Center near Manchac. Luckily, both companies carried insurance. Unfortunately, both insurers quickly pointed the finger at each other.

Such situations occur frequently when contracting parties in large projects require multiple insurance policies to cover the myriad situations which could give rise to liability. The most important question from the victim’s perspective, however, is simply how and when he or she will be compensated.

When such finger-pointing occurs, the task devolves upon the courts to “rank” the policies. The longshoreman’s case, Deville v. Conmaco/Rector L.P., involved competing claims of three insurance companies. The crane owner carried general liability insurance and the employer carried an “excess” insurance policy — a policy which kicks in only after coverage limits have been reached on other applicable policies. In addition to these policies, however, the crane lease itself required the employer to obtain a third policy to cover its use of the crane.

Settlement agreements are compromises between two people or companies that face a lawsuit. Their purpose is to avoid the high costs and extensive time involved in taking a case to trial. These settlements, however, include terms that require careful consideration before signing.

In the case of Montgomery v. Montgomery, Chad was trimming a tree on his brother Richard’s land, using a frontloader to lift him high enough to reach the limbs. His father, R.L., was operating the frontloader. R.L. accidently hit the quick release, dropping Chad and injuring him. R.L. was covered by homeowners insurance and farm insurance from Farm Bureau. Richard’s land was covered by insurance from American Reliable Insurance Company. Chad sought a recovery from both Farm Bureau and American Reliable. Chad was able to receive money from both companies through settlements. In the American Reliable settlement agreement, Chad received a $100,000 settlement in turn for agreeing to release both insurance companies and his father from any further claims. The Farm Bureau only agreed to give $1,000, but also included a statement that it was released from all claims.

This release from all claims is a common feature of settlements. The insurance company agrees to pay some amount of money in return for no further liability, or obligation to pay any more. However, this is a major concession on the part of the injured person. In the words of the Farm Bureau agreement, Chad agreed to “release, acquit and forever discharge” the insurance company for any injury sustained, even if it is “not yet evident, recognized or known.” The American Reliable agreement stated that he gave up “any and all…claims” from “any and all known and unknown personal injuries.”

This agreement can only be questioned by a court if there is “substantiating evidence” of mistaken intent. This means that there is evidence showing that the person signing “was mistaken as to what he or she was signing” or that the person “did not intend to release certain aspects of his or her claim.” Otherwise, any challenge to such a settlement will be thrown out of court through summary judgment. The insurer also has a duty to “adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the injured [person].” If the insurer misrepresents “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to any” injury coverage that is at issue, then it violates this duty.

Some time after signing the agreements, Chad began to feel that his injuries were worse than he had originally thought. He then filed a lawsuit against Farm Bureau. He claimed that the agreement with Farm Bureau had been misrepresented to him. The court, however, granted summary judgment to Farm Bureau. It stated that Chad had presented no evidence that he had misunderstood what he was signing. In addition, the American Reliable agreement released Farm Bureau from any claims. Chad argued that there was misrepresentation regarding Farm Bureau, but not regarding the American Reliable agreement.

Settlement agreements involve signing away significant rights to future damages. Such an agreement should be made only with the advice of an experienced attorney.

Continue reading

After a man was seriously injured in a one-car accident in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, and rendered disabled to the point that he was no longer able to complete his job, he began to receive short term disability benefits from his employer. After those benefits expired, the man filed a claim for long term disability benefits. However, this claim was denied by the provider. The company’s policy with regard to long term disability benefits expressly prohibits the coverage of losses that are due to illegal acts. In this case, the man involved in the accident was reported to have had a blood alcohol level of 0.15, almost twice the legal limit in Louisiana, at the time of the accident.

Once his claim was denied, the man requested an appeal, claiming that the insurance company could not deny him coverage under the clause regarding illegal acts. The man provided several reasons why his act of driving under the influence should not be included in this clause: the policy did not include a specific “intoxication” provision; driving under the influence did not constitute an illegal act; even if it was an illegal act, the company could not prove that the accident happened because of his intoxication. At the time of the accident, two cars were racing towards him, and he had to swerve to miss them. The man claims that this was the real reason for the accident and that it had nothing to do with his intoxication.

In response to the man’s claims, the policy provider underwent an intensive investigation to determine whether or not it should grant the injured man’s long term disability claims. As part of the investigation, they found that the man’s blood alcohol level would have impaired his reflexes and reaction time at the time of the accident. Furthermore, by this time the man was indicted and given a DUI. Because of the DUI, medical records, and an export report that stated that the intoxication and resulting impairment contributed to the accident, the policy provider once again denied the man’s claims for coverage.

At this time, the man brought his claim against the policy provider to court. The trial court actually sided with the injured man, granting his motion for summary judgment with regard to coverage because it agreed that applying the “illegal acts” clause to the man’s case was unjust. Naturally, the policy provider appealed the case, claiming that the trial court had erred in reaching its decision. Specifically, the policy provider claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion in reaching its decision.

If the policy provider had the authority to interpret the terms of the policy and determine the individual’s eligibility for benefits, then the abuse of discretion standard would be the proper standard to employ. Under the “abuse of discretion” standard, the trial court or any other court reviewing the choices made by the policy provider should uphold the company’s decisions unless the person bringing claim against the company can prove that the company’s decisions were arbitrary. While the man argues that this is not the appropriate standard to use, the appellate court agrees that the policy expressly gave the policy provider the right to make all determinations with regard to eligibility for benefits.

So, now the court must simply decide whether or not this determination to deny the man’s claims was capricious or not. According to relevant case law, under the abuse of discretion standard, as long as the policy provider’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious, then deference should be given to that decision. After reviewing the evidence, the court agreed that the policy provider interpreted the policy reasonably and that there was substantial evidence for the policy provider to deny the man’s claim. Because of this finding, the appellate court ultimately reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the policy provider’s denial of coverage and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Continue reading

A recent case in the Parish of Lafayette, Louisiana, demonstrates conflictive viewpoints and the shifting burden of responsibility that can take place in an automobile accident, much less one taking place in a parking lot. The plaintiff, Ms. Duhon, was driving her 2009 Lincoln MKX in a parking lot on property in Lafayette when a 2006 Toyota Sequoia driven by Ms. Foley entered the parking lot from Ambassador Caffery Parkway and the vehicles collided. The defendant was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm).

Ms. Duhon filed suit against Ms. Foley and her insurer, State Farm, seeking recovery for (1) the out of pocket deductible she paid for repairs to her vehicle; (2) the out of pocket rental expenses she paid; and, (3) the diminution in value of her vehicle as a result of this accident. However, the trial court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Ms. Foley, finding Ms. Duhon one hundred percent at fault for the incident, eventually leading to an appeal.

Ms. Duhon asserts the trial court erred in finding her at fault and denying her recovery of the damages she allegedly sustained in the accident. The Court of Appeal, for the Second Circuit of Louisiana, amended the trial court’s decision to a fifty-fifty fault allocation. The Court applies the manifest error standard of review in their findings. Under this standard, the Court of Appeal must meet the following two-part test: (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. After reviewing the record in its entirety, the Court of Appeal found that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the trial court’s findings and that the trial court’s determination of negligence exclusively on the part of Ms. Duhon was manifest error. Not only did Ms. Foley’s testimony conflict with Ms. Duhon’s, it was also not corroborated by the physical evidence. Even the trial court intimated comparative fault of the drivers when it stated in its oral reasons for judgment that “neither party entered with enough caution to avoid the accident.” Thus, the trial court erred in assessing no fault to Ms. Foley for this accident.

Contact Information