Articles Posted in Hurricane Gustav Insurance Dispute Information

storm_damage_oak_tree-scaledHurricanes can result in significant property damage, including flooding with contaminated water. When faced with such a situation, homeowners may wonder if they have a viable lawsuit against the responsible parties, such as the company responsible for the contaminants or the city involved in managing the wastewater system. The following case sheds light on the legal considerations surrounding property damage caused by contaminated floodwater and the potential liability of the responsible entities.

Ronald and Virginia Colson owned property in Pineville, Louisiana, that was damaged by Hurricane Gustav. They claimed their property was flooded with water contaminated with contaminates from Colfax Treating Company’s wood-treating facility. As a result, they claimed they were evicted from their home. 

Colfax had a permit to dispose of materials in Pineville’s wastewater system. The Colsons filed a lawsuit against Colfax and the City of Pineville. The Colsons claimed the City of Pineville did not timely activate pumps for evacuating waste and stormwater, failed to properly maintain or inspect these pumps, and improperly allowed Colfax to dispose of the contaminates at above-legal limits. 

In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Louisiana legislature set deadlines for the filing of claims for damages resulting from the hurricanes. These dates were September 1, 2007 for claims of damage resulting from Hurricane Katrina and October 1, 2007 for claims of damage resulting from Hurricane Rita. Any claims filed beyond these dates would be subject to the exception of prescription, meaning that any legal remedies stemming from such damages would be extinguished. Under certain circumstances, however, Louisiana law allows for the suspension of prescription. For members of an ongoing class action in Louisiana state court, the deadline to file individual claims based on the same damages is suspended.

The countdown for the valid filing of individual claims begins to run again when a class member elects to be excluded from the class action or is notified that he or she has been excluded from the action, or is notified that the action has been dismissed. Once the countdown starts to run again, it resumes with how much time was left before the commencement of the class action. For instance, if there were two months remaining to file an individual claim of damages at the time a class action was started, the countdown for a class member’s individual claim would resume with two months remaining upon the member’s exclusion or the dismissal of the class action. This would hold true no matter how much time had elapsed since the class action’s commencement. However, it is crucial to note that such suspension of prescription is only allowed for class actions in Louisiana state court.

In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, a couple in Harvey, LA filed an individual claim for property damages resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita more than two years after the deadline set by the legislature. Because the couple were members of a recently dismissed class action in federal court seeking the same damages, they argued that the countdown for the filing of their individual claim had been suspended. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled, however, that only class actions filed in Louisiana state court (rather than federal class actions, or class actions in another state’s court system) could suspend the deadline for filing claims under Louisiana law. This meant that the couple’s individual claim had long expired unless they could prove membership in a class action in Louisiana state court for the same damages during that period.

In April 2010, an offshore drilling rig, the Deepwater Horizon, exploded and sank into the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven workers died and crude oil from the well spilled into the Gulf for months after the accident. The result was a mass of litigation involving multiple defendants. In order to deal with the extensive facts and individuals involved in this case, like many other cases, the parties can appeal just one issue of the case if the lower court denies or grants a judgment on that particular issue.

Normally, a decision must be a final one in order to be appealed. That generally means that the case has concluded and the lower court has rendered a judgment. That way, the appeals court considers all of the facts involved, but can still allow the lower court to do most of the fact analysis. However, there are some occasions where an appeal on just one issue is allowed. This is known as an interlocutory appeal, and it falls under the collateral order doctrine. The collateral order doctrine assumes that some decisions are “final in effect although they do not dispose of the litigation.”

In order to use the collateral order doctrine, the lower court must have 1) conclusively determined the disputed question, 2) resolved an important issue that is completely separate from the final decision in the case, and 3) the issue must also be effectively unreviewable on appeal in a final judgment. “Effectively unreviewable” means that the court of appeals will have no way to review the decision of the lower court once the lower court makes a decision on this particular issue. Generally, if the decision could be appealed in some other way than the interlocutory appeal, then the court will not use the interlocutory appeal.

In the oil spill case, parties assumed that one worker in particular held a great deal of information because he was the BP Well Site Leader on duty aboard the rig at the time of the accident. However, the Site Leader had an undisclosed medical condition that prohibited him from testifying or answering written questions. The Site Leader explained his medical condition to the judge on two separate occasions, but did not disclose the information to the parties.

Since the parties believed that he was such a valuable witness, they really wanted to obtain information from him. As such, another judge ordered an independent doctor to examine him and ordered the Site Leader to produce his medical records to the independent doctor. The Site Leader protested because he was concerned about sharing his personal information. This order is a discovery decision, and discovery decisions are appealable after the final decision of the court based on the use of inadmissible evidence.

One of the Site Leader’s major arguments, however, was that releasing his personal medical information would cause a great deal of harm to him personally, and there is no method on appeal to reverse that type of harm. Nonetheless, the court determined that district courts can “burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of the final district court judgment.” Therefore, even though there may be harm that cannot be reversed for the Site Leader, the court will still allow the medical information to come in because the final verdict could change on appeal if the information is removed later. To use another example, the court explains that even if the information is privileged, that does not make it appropriate for an interlocutory appeal.

The court only briefly considered the rights of the Site Leader and his concern about protecting his personal information. In that discussion, they explain that they weighed the costs of sharing his information with the benefits of having his testimony at trial and determined that the benefits outweighed the costs.

As result, the court determined that it could not use the collateral order doctrine and that the interlocutory appeal was inappropriate. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and allowed the bulk of the case to continue in the lower court.

Civil procedure issues can be a delicate balance between protecting the case and protecting the individuals involved in the case.

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Years after Hurricane Rita, which hit in September 2005, those who have had their homes damaged are still dealing with cleaning up the wreckage and rebuilding. Litigation involving insurance companies is still particularly prominent. One couple from Lake Charles, Louisiana knows about this type of litigation all too well.

The couple had homeowners insurance through State Farm and made a claim for damage to their home as result of the storm. State Farm paid them for the damages and they began to rebuild. However, after the claims were settled, the couple found that significant damage to the home’s rafters in the attic. An adjuster came right over and paid the couple for damage to three windows. The rafters, on the other hand, were a different question. There was a separation between the center beam and the rafters that connected to the center beam to support the roof; the center beam was essential to the strength and integrity of the home’s overall structure. State Farm explained that the couple needed to have the opinion of an engineer to support their claim for damage to the rafters.

In Louisiana, like many other states, lay people are generally not allowed to offer their opinions at trial. Instead, they are supposed to supply facts and the jury or judge is supposed to provide their opinion, resulting in the outcome of the trial. The witness should not substitute their opinion for that of the factfinder. However, if the witness is certified as an expert in a particular area, then they can give their opinion to the court.

Testimony of expert witnesses is particularly useful in highly technical trials. For example, if an individual is suing for a personal injury, it may be helpful to have a doctor come in to explain the injury and state how he or she thinks the plaintiff acquired the injury. If you can only acquire the injury a certain way, then the fact finder should know that information so they can provide an accurate final verdict.

In this case, the couple had their contractor come in to testify. Their contractor built the home and testified as to his opinion of how the damage occurred. He was a valuable witness because he could tell the judge that when he built the home, the center beam and rafters were not separated as they are now. He explained that if they were separated like that, then the house would not have been up to code and the couple could not have lived there.

The couple also employed an engineer to testify at the trial regarding the cause of the split in the rafters. The engineer looked at the house after the storm and, using his experience, explained that only extremely high winds could have created that kind of damage in the time between when the house was built and shortly after Hurricane Rita hit. He also stated that the home’s structure would have continued to get worse if the attic frame was not properly restored.

State Farm argued that the contractor was not an appropriate expert because he was not trained to be an expert regarding causation of the movement in the rafters. Because he was not an engineer, he could not compute the effect of the wind speed on the house nearly as well as an engineer could. However, State Farm did not like the engineer that the couple used either. In fact, they argued, the contractor did not even use the correct wind speed when he calculated the effect of the wind, so his testimony should be entirely discredited.

The court determined that both the contractor’s and the engineer’s testimony would remain in evidence. First, it concluded that the contractor was not retained as an expert for the trial, so he did not need to be qualified as an expert. Instead, he spoke about the before and after affects regarding the rafters. Louisiana law allows witnesses who are not experts to testify about their inferences and opinions if they are “rationally based upon the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of [the] testimony or determination of the fact at issue.” In addition, the court kept the engineer’s testimony because they determined that even though he had used the incorrect wind speed in his calculations, the correct wind speed would not have changed the outcome of his opinion.

Witnesses can make or break a case, and expert witnesses are particularly important to explain technical concepts that the average person may not understand. Those technical concepts are usually essential to the case.

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The settlement in Orrill v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan demonstrates some of the hurdles faced by class action litigants and the benefits of having experienced class counsel. In that case, Katrina and Rita victims sought statutory penalties for their insurers’ failure to pay claims within the 30 days required by statute. The long history of the case dates to 2005, immediately after the storms first hit. The Berniard Law Firm vigorously pursued their claims past procedural roadblocks along the way to a final settlement this past January.

While class actions provide an obviously efficient way of adjudicating large controversies, the drawbacks associated with this device are equally apparent. Class actions allow courts to resolve all claims related to an occurrence in a single proceeding. This means, however, that even claims of those who do not participate must be decided. Otherwise, class members could “free ride” off the efforts of others, waiting to see whether a legal strategy or theory will succeed or fail without expending any efforts or resources. Courts have long resolved this dilemma by requiring class action plaintiffs to provide adequate notice to those who might have claims and by requiring that participants meet a series of requirements.

First, the class must consist of a sufficiently large number of claimants. Courts have not defined this “numerosity” requirement precisely; rather, a plaintiff satisfies this requirement by establishing that traditional methods of joining parties would be unreasonably difficult or expensive. Second, the claims of the class members must involve common issues. To meet this “commonality” requirement, it is not enough simply to have claims resulting from the same injury. Instead those claims must be capable of resolution in the same way. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, what is important is not the raising of common questions, but “capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers.”

A recent United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit case set out an extensive definition and explanation of summary judgment. Summary judgment occurs when there are “no genuine dispute[s] as to any material fact.” That is, both parties agree with all of the facts that are used to determine the case. A “material fact” is one that could affect the overall outcome of the case based on the applicable law. When summary judgments are appealed, the appeals court uses a de novo standard–they look at all the facts and apply the same standards as the lower court would. They examine the facts “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” However, the court will not just accept unsubstantiated allegations in favor of the nonmoving party; the claims have to have some support. The nonmoving party is the party that won summary judgment in the lower court, so the moving party is the party that is contesting the summary judgment.

When examining a summary judgment on appeal, the moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is inappropriate. In order to do that, the moving party must show that there is some dispute regarding a material fact. The burden is somewhat light if the moving party would not have the burden if the case went to trial. Instead, the moving party would only have to show, “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case” instead of proving that the evidence may weigh in the moving party’s favor. Once the moving party has proven their burden, then the nonmoving party will take the burden and must counter the moving party’s arguments.

In the Fifth Circuit case, a homeowner alleged that Hurricane Ike caused damage to his roof that his insurance company should cover. His roof was leaking and he pointed out that the wind likely damaged his roof, causing water leaks. State Farm, his insurance company, completed an evaluation of the roof and determined that he was missing four shingles, had four damaged ridge caps and had acquired one fresh interior water spot. State Farm concluded that most of the damage that the plaintiff complained of was actually damage that could have only occurred over several years due to deterioration or faulty workmanship when the roof was installed. The State Farm insurance policy did not cover these two latter instances, but provided reimbursement for the damaged shingles, ridge caps, and the new water spot in the ceiling. State Farm awarded roughly $450.00.

The plaintiff was very unhappy with this result and conducted damage evaluations of its own, each of which concluded that the damage was considerably higher than State Farm provided. However, these damage reports did not mention how the damage was caused; they just explained how much it would cost to fix the water damage as a whole. State Farm also conducted damage evaluations that separated any damage likely caused by Hurricane Ike and damage caused by leaking over time. Their evaluations were consistent with what they already awarded the plaintiff.

Based on the various evaluations, the lower court granted summary judgment for State Farm and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff, as the moving party, could not meet his burden to override the summary judgment determination. The Court found that the evaluations as to any damage that Hurricane Ike may have caused were extremely important in this case. Since the only wind damage would have been related to the missing shingles, damaged ridge caps, and small water spot, and State Farm already paid for that, the Court found no reason to override the summary judgment.

Once summary judgment has been awarded, it is somewhat difficult to overcome on appeal.

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The Federal National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) is a federal program that allows homeowners to protect against flooding because most homeowners insurance does not cover flooding (You can check out their website here). It is offered to homeowners, renters and some business owners. The federal government works with private insurance companies to encourage them to offer insurance. The government sets a standard rate and then the insurance is actually through the private insurance company, but involves the federal government to a great degree. The federal government underwrites, or supports the insurance company, but the private insurance company does all of the related administrative tasks.

Because of the federal government’s involvement, when there are issues with the insurance company, you must follow unique litigation paths in order to recover for any damages in many occasions. For example, the federal government will normally cover any litigation costs for the private insurance company. As such, some procedures that would normally be acceptable at the state level may not be allowed in the federal court.

A case in Mississippi that was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals helps explain these differences. In that case, Grissom, the insured individual, had insurance under the NFIP through Liberty Mutual. He was eligible for a preferred risk insurance policy, but did not know he was eligible. After Hurricane Katrina, he argued that he would have purchased the preferred risk insurance policy if he had known about his eligibility.

Even in 2012, issues regarding Hurricane Katrina, which occurred in 2005, are still prevalent. Insurance companies are particularly affected by Katrina, and they are still attempting to sort out many claims. Some of the contract claims that are still moving through the courts are somewhat unique. For example, contracts occasionally have provisions where both parties can appoint an appraiser if the two parties cannot decide how much damage actually occurred. The insurance policies will only insure up to a certain amount, of course, but determining the amount of damage is a vital part of reimbursement of the claim.

An apartment building in Metairie, Louisiana carried insurance that had such an appraisal policy. The contract explained that both parties were to appoint their own appraiser, who is supposed to be fair and impartial. Then, a third individual, the umpire, would be appointed. The umpire takes both of the appraisers’ estimates, examines them, and then comes up with a third number that will be the final number for total damage. The two parties are supposed to appoint the umpire as well, but if the two parties cannot decide on an umpire, then the court can appoint one for them.

In this case, the court did appoint an umpire. However, the court not only appointed an umpire, but also imposed certain rules and restrictions to the appraisal process. In particular, the court restricted the documents that the umpire could receive and required that if the umpire needed to communicate with either party then the opposing party would also be included in the conversation. The communication issues required the umpire to copy both parties on e-mails, letters, and make conference calls. Communication with just one party was strictly not allowed. In addition, neither party was to give the umpire documentation of a legal nature that would attempt to convince the umpire that the award should be a certain amount. Instead, the documentation was limited to receipts, inspections, and other impartial information.

The apartment’s appraiser valued the damage at approximately $200,000, but the insurance company’s appraiser valued the damage at zero. The apartment owner argued that the insurance company’s appraiser was not being impartial because they did not award any damages. However, the insurance company noticed that the apartment owners had already fixed most of the damage using funds from other insurance companies, so the insurance company’s appraiser determined that the apartment owners were not entitled to any more damage payments.

The umpire agreed with the insurance company’s appraiser and recommended that the damage award be zero. Naturally, the apartment owner was upset by this result, so he appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the State of Louisiana. The apartment owner argued that the court interfered too much with the process–the apartment owner should have been able to give the umpire whatever documentation they wanted and communicated however they wanted.

The Court disagreed. It began its analysis by underscoring that although the two parties had an appraisal clause in their contract, the clause does not take away the court’s right to hear a case. In addition, insurance policies are contracts, and should be interpreted under the regular principles of contracts. Therefore, the court will interpret the contract using its regular meaning unless some of the phrases have gained technical definitions in that particular line of business.

The Court explained that the two parties deliberately involved the court when they stated in the contract that the court was to assign an umpire if the two parties could not agree to one. The appraisal portion of the contract did not set specific guidelines in the process, so the court stepped in to create them. The lower court explained that they were afraid the umpire was getting far too much irrelevant information, so they intervened. The Court deemed this a completely acceptable practice under the circumstances. The Court also decided that the insurance company’s appraiser was sufficiently impartial. Lastly, the Court concluded that since the lower court acted appropriately, the award of zero damages should still stand.

This case illustrates a unique clause that could potentially be helpful for the insured, but since the clause was not detailed enough to limit the court’s actions, it turned out to be detrimental.

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Licensed attorneys in New Orleans were asked which attorney they would recommend to residents in the New Orleans area. Attorney Jeffrey Berniard, of the New Orleans-based Berniard Law Firm, LLC, was named one of the best mass litigation and class action attorneys in New Orleans in the November 2012 issue of the magazine. Propelled into success by holding insurance companies accountable in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Berniard has built the Berniard Law Firm into one of the premiere personal injury law practices in not only New Orleans, but the entire state of Louisiana. Since Hurricane Katrina, Berniard Law Firm has focused on insurance disputes and class action litigation.

Jeffrey Berniard has been involved in several high-profile cases, solidifying his expertise in complex high risk litigation. He worked on the highly publicized Deep Water Horizon oil rig case in the Gulf Coast, representing a very large group of individuals affected by the sinking oil rig. In 2008, Berniard Law Firm secured a $35 million dollar settlement for a class of 70,000 members seeking bad faith penalties for tardy payments by a Louisiana insurance company in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. In 2009, the Berniard Law Firm participated in five class actions against insurance companies and corporations. In the process of these major claims, the firm also helped many residents of the Gulf Coast with their personal injury concerns, insurance claims and business disputes.

– What is Mass Tort Litigation? –

In the first year of law school, nearly every student takes a course in Contracts. Contract law is one of the bases of our legal system and is at the core of almost all legal agreements. Everytime you get car insurance, sign a lease, agree to pay your plumber or electrician for work, or sign up for new cellphone service, you are dealing with a contract.

In contracts, every single word and punctuation mark is important. Clear, concise and unambiguous language is vital to writing a good contract. Sometimes even big companies enter into contracts that contain ambiguous language. These ambiguities can cause legal problems down the road. The case of WH Holdings, L.L.C. et al. v. ACE American Insurance Company illustrates how ambiguous contract language can lead to legal problems for the parties involved.

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, WH Holdings, the owner of the Ritz Carlton Hotel Complex in New Orleans, hired Gootee Construction Company to renovate the existing structure of the complex. Gootee was in the process of performing the renovations when Hurricane Katrina made landfall and caused damage to the exterior of the building. WH Holdings filed suit against Gootee’s insurer, ACE American Insurance Company, for almost $3.3 million for damage to the exterior of the hotel.
The parties agreed that the contract was governed by a form document known as the General Conditions of the Contract for Construction (General Conditions). The General Conditions is a document that contains amendments that the parties negotiated themselves – the Court acknowledges that these amendments are clearly marked in the document.

Both parties also agreed that WH Holdings was only covered under the policy which ACE issued to Gootee if, and only if, WH Holdings qualified as an insured party under the policy. Thus the entire case rested on whether or not Gootee was “contractually obligated… to insure WH Holdings such that it became an insured on the ACE policy.”

To reach its decision, the District Court looked at two clauses of the contract, Subsections 11.4.1 and 11.1.5(g). The parties distinctly amended a portion of Subsection 11.4.1. to seemingly place the responsibility of purchasing property insurance on Gootee. The District Court even acknowledged that if 11.4.1 stood alone, ACE would have no basis to contest WH Holdings claim. However, the District Court held that a separate subsection, 11.1.5(g), located in a different portion of the contract, changed the meaning of 11.4.1 by “unambiguously… obligating WH Holdings to carry the insurance ‘when the construction is an addition or a renovation.'”
The district court granted ACE’s motion for summary judgment and concluded that WH Holdings was not an insured party under the contract and Gootee had no responsibility to insure WH Holdings.

The 5th Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s analysis stating that while the district court “relied entirely on subsection 11.1.5(g) in finding the contract unambiguous… subsection 11.1.5(g) is not as ‘crystal clear’ as the district court thought it to be.” The Court goes on to point out that 11.1.5(g) appeared in an entirely different portion of the contract than 11.4.1. Subsection 11.1.5(g) appeared in a section of the contract covering “Contractor’s Liability Insurance” while 11.4.1 appeared in a section entitled “Property Insurance.” The Court found that 11.1.5(g) is limited in scope by a preceding clause and therefore does not modify 11.4.1, and to read it any other way would be ignoring this express limit. The 5th Circuit finally stated that it simply cannot agree with Gootee’s assertion and the District Court’s conclusion that the contract language unambiguously obligated WH Holdings to purchase property insurance.

The 5th Circuit also disagreed with WH Holdings argument that it was in fact Gootee who was “unambiguously required… to purchase the property insurance” since WH Holdings was unable to persuasively argue their interpretation. Stating that there were “difficulties with each party’s contention that the contract unambiguously supports its position,” the 5th Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case back to the District Court. Finally, due to the ambiguous nature of the contract, the 5th Circuit also ordered the District Court to examine outside evidence brought by both parties regarding the meaning of the contract and to examine how both parties had performed the contract prior to the lawsuit being brought.

Contracts can be extremely important and very complicated particularly when dealing with insurance issues. Hiring the proper attorney is very important to ensure that all documents relevant are maintained, and provided, from start to finish, as well as to navigate any complicated appeals that may arise.

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