Articles Posted in Hurricane Insurance Verdicts

The state of Louisiana, like many other states, has very specific requirements that the judicial branch uses to help interpret contracts when the parties are in dispute. Generally, the court likes to stay out of contracts because the right to contract without interference from the government is something that the American society greatly cherishes. The ability to contract is a basic fundamental right that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court will usually only interfere if there is a dispute or if the contract was in some way illegal. Therefore, it is very important to have a contract that is well written and that all parties understand completely.

If the court has to step in to work with a contract, then it will follow a few select guidelines. The ultimate goal of the court is to determine the common intent of the parties and enforce the contract in that way. In order to determine the intent, the court will look to the contract itself. In contracts that include terms of art or very technical requirements, the court will look to the common use of the word within that trade. For example, some trades include quantity information that is always larger than actually stated; think of a “baker’s dozen.” Even though twelve is technically considered a dozen, a contract between bakers may actually mean thirteen. This notion disregards the fact that in any other contract that is not between bakers, a dozen would equal twelve.

The court will also consider the contract in its entirety, not just a few sections or a single disputed term. It will determine what outcome is practical for both parties and technical terms will be given their technical meaning. In addition, if a word has more than one meaning, then the court will defer to the meaning that will carry out the goal of the contract. Consider a simple example. If a grocery store contracts to receive bananas and they receive plastic bananas instead of real bananas, the court will likely conclude that the other party providing the plastic bananas was at fault because the definition of a banana is commonly a consumable food, especially if it is going to be sold at a grocery store. The contract did not say that the grocery store wanted edible bananas, but the court will assume this information because the outcome becomes ridiculous without this assumption.

The court will generally try to stay within the language of the contract when attempting to resolve disputes. When the contract is clear and doesn’t lead to ridiculous consequences, then external evidence provided by the parties to show an alternative intent cannot be considered. The contract’s wording is therefore very important. However, if the contract is not clear or is ridiculous, then the court can consider some outside evidence in order to determine the common intent of the parties. In our banana example, if the grocery store has always ordered real bananas from this seller and has never requested plastic bananas from this seller, then that information could be considered in the court’s analysis.

The court has a means to determine whether the meaning of the contract is clear or not. Obviously if a term or issue is missing from the contract entirely, then the court will most likely deem the issue to be unclear or ambiguous. In addition, the court will also reason that an issue is ambiguous when “the language used in the contract is uncertain or is fairly susceptible to more than one interpretation.” If this is the case, then the outside evidence can be used to determine what the intent of both parties actually is.

A well written contract will convey the intention of both parties and will define all of its questionable terms so that there is no contention in the future. Sometimes, one party does not think a term in unclear when it actually is, so a conflict will arise. Competent attorneys are needed to create a well written contract and deal with conflict.

Continue reading

A summary judgment is rendered when a trial court decides that there are no genuine issues of material fact that need to be determined. “Manifestly erroneous” is the high standard under which summary judgments are reversed on appeal. Summary judgments are cheaper and less time consuming than full blown trials; they are a means toward the end of judicial expediency, a goal that becomes increasingly important to our judicial system over time. Despite the importance of this procedural device, many cases do not call for summary judgment. Sometimes trial courts grant full or partial summary judgments in error and are reversed. That is what occurred in the case of Jagneux v. Frohn, which you can read here.

The defendants in this case convinced the trial court that no issues of fact existed that required litigating. Their legal journey was not over though due to the plaintiff’s appeal. The court of appeals applied the standard promulgated by the Louisiana Supreme Court. This Louisiana Supreme Court’s standard initially places the burden of proof on the party that is moving for a summary judgment. The moving party must prove that one or more elements of the adverse party’s claim or defense lacks any factual support on the record so far. The opposing party is then granted an opportunity to prove that there have been facts alleged that support that party’s position. At the time of summary judgment the record is sparse so a granting of summary judgment represents a finding by the court that no facts supporting a particular party’s, in this case the plaintiff’s, position.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision in this case because it found that the issue of whether Mrs. Kling, a defendant in this case, was the driver of the white SUV at the time that it, at least partially, caused the accident at issue in this case. Because there was conflicting evidence about where Mrs. Kling was and whether or not she was actually in control of the car at the time of the accident, summary judgment was not the right choice in this case. The trial court is not to weigh the merits of the case when addressing summary judgment. Summary judgment is only appropriate in cases where no potentially meritorious case is presented by one of the parties.

Governments traditionally were immune from lawsuit. That has changed. In certain circumstances, governments may be held liable for the damage they cause. A coulee flooded homes in Lake Charles after Hurricane Rita, although the area is protected by a drainage district that operates pumps and pipes to ensure drainage. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed a jury award against the drainage district in Bordelon v. Gravity Drainage District No. 4 of Ward 3 of Calcasieu Parish, No. 10-1318 (La. Ct. App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11).

Drainage district employees typically stayed in pump houses during hurricanes, but in July 2005, Louisiana state officials determined that no evacuation site in Calcasieu Parish could withstand a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The drainage district has automated pumps run by electricity, but if the power went out, the diesel-fueled backup pumps required human operation. Hurricane Rita was expected to hit land as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The district decided to allow its employees to evacuate with their families to Opelousas, Ville Platte, and Lafayette. The whole area south of Interstate 10 in Lake Charles was a part of the evacuation.

Rita unexpectedly weakened to category 3 when it made landfall on Friday, September 24, 2005. Electrical power was wiped out across a wide area. The drainage district’s electric pumps at Pithon Coulee stopped at 9 p.m. No one was in the pump house to start the diesel pumps. When residents returned the next morning, their homes were fine, but the coulee waters were rising. Drainage district employees had yet to be recalled. The houses began flooding from the rising coulee waters after 3 p.m. Saturday. Early on Sunday, the district workers returned. They turned on the pumps at 8:30 a.m. By noon, the coulee was below flood stage.

Twenty-four homeowners sought damages from the district because it failed to plan a way to automate the diesel pumps and because its decisions during Hurricane Rita resulted in flooding. The district argued it was protected by governmental immunity under Louisiana Revised Statutes. A jury awarded the homeowners $1,570,219.60, although it recognized that the liability of the district’s insurer, American Alternative Insurance Corporation, was limited to $1 million. The drainage district and its insurer appealed.

Courts strictly interpret immunity statutes to limit their reach. Two statutes may protect the district. The Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act provides immunity when a government is “engaged in any homeland security and emergency preparedness activities” as a part of complying with the Act. An unpublished court of appeal decision persuasively limits immunity to actions taken during an emergency, but not before. Based on that decision, the jury decided against the drainage district because it failed to have a plan in place before the hurricane’s forecasted arrival. The court of appeal agreed. “A failure to plan for an emergency is not an emergency preparedness activity under the statutes conferring immunity for such activities.” The district was not immune for not having a plan to keep pumps running when the pump houses were not staffed and power was out.

Louisiana state and local governments also are not liable “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.” Immunity exists for policymaking or acts for which a choice is acceptable within the government’s delegated powers. If the act is “not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists,” or was done criminally or in some way intentionally, immunity does not apply.

The Louisiana statute is patterned after the Federal Tort Claims Act. A two-part test determines if immunity applies. Did the government employee have discretion, a choice, or did law require the employee to follow a certain course of conduct? If a specific action is mandatory, no immunity applies. If the employee has a choice, was that discretion “grounded in social, economic or political policy”? If not, the government may be liable. Louisiana has adopted the federal test for the state governmental immunity statute.

The court of appeal recognized that planning is an act of discretion, and ensuring employee safety above concerns to protect property “is clearly within the discretion of the district.” But, automating the diesel pumps had never been considered, although it would cost only $40,000 and the money was available. By statute, “the drainage district shall make adequate provision for the drainage of all lands and property affected thereby.” The district was required to provide adequate drainage of all property. The failure to consider a feasible alternative to ensure compliance with a statutory mandate prevented immunity for the effects of not automating the pumps. The court of appeal affirmed the district court jury verdict.

If you believe you have been harmed by a government, it is hard to know what to do. Government duties come from statutes and regulations, and governments may be protected from lawsuits. But not always. A lawyer will be able to review your claim and determine the government’s authority and potential liability.

Continue reading

When one is successful on a claim against an insurance company the payment of the claim is expected to be prompt. Any delay in payment could result in the court imposing a penalty against the insurance company. In most, if not all, cases this penalty takes the form of court costs and attorney’s fees. But if an insurance company challenges a policy claim in court, and then loses, does that time when payment was refused constitute delay? The answer to this question is ‘it depends.’

In Louisiana Bag Co. v. Audubon Indemnity Co., the court held that if an insurer errs in interpreting its own insurance contract, then the insurance company will be held liable for the delay in payment resulting from the trial. This delay justifies the incurrence of penalties for attorney’s fees. If, however, the policy dispute revolves around facts rather than contract interpretation, then the “timely payment” provision is stayed during the trial. This was the situation of Maxley v. Universal Casualty Co. where Maxley’s car insurance policy through Casualty covered loss from both theft and fire. When Maxley’s car was stolen and set on fire, he filed for his claim. However, Maxley had left his car unlocked with the key in it. The policy through Casualty had an exception that nullified any claim if there was no evidence of forcible entry. The issue went to court with Casualty claiming it owed nothing under the policy because the theft was not through a forcible entry, and Maxley contesting payment was due under the fire provision of the policy rather than the theft. Maxley, in essence, argued that the exclusion provision for no evidence of forced entry was irrelevant because his car would have been recovered if it had not been for the fire.

The court found for Maxley, who then sought attorney’s fees for Casualty’s failure to make timely payment. The Third Court of Appeal upheld the denial of Maxley’s claim, stating that Maxley’s reliance on Louisiana Bag was misplaced. While Louisiana Bag relied on policy interpretation, Maxley’s case relied on a true disputation of the facts. It would be senseless to require the insurance company to pay the claim only to the have the claim payment rescinded if the facts were found in favor of the insurance company. This finding upholds efficiency in the industry as it is easier to withhold payment until truly due than it is to always make payment, then try to recoup it if made erroneously.

It is well settled under Louisiana law that insurers owe a duty of “good faith and fair dealing” to their customers. Each insurance company is required to adjust claims in a fair and prompt manner and to make reasonable efforts to settle claims when possible. La. R.S. 22:1973 establishes that damages may be awarded against an insurance company that fails to meet this duty. One category of wrongdoing includes:

“Failing to pay the amount of any claim due any person insured by the contract within sixty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the claimant when such failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.”

The statute also permits a wronged insured to collect penalties from the insurer “in an amount not to exceed two times the damages sustained or five thousand dollars, whichever is greater.” The purpose of this law is to discourage insurers from failing to live up to the promises they make to their customers in their insurance policies and for which the customers pay premiums.

On October 27, 2004, Carl Guidry and his granddaughter were driving in Guidry’s pickup truck. They were rear-ended by Amber Guidry (no relation) and Guidry’s truck was knocked forward. Guidry suffered from neck and back pain following the accident. Two weeks later, on November 11, 2004, Guidry and his granddaughter were again rear-ended while driving in Guidry’s truck, this time by an SUV driven by Evelyn Smith. Guidry experienced further neck and back pain, as well as shoulder pain, after the second collision. Guidry sued both Amber Guidry and Evelyn Smith, and also sued his own uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) carrier, Progressive. Guidry settled with Amber Guidry’s insurance carrier in the first accident for the policy limits of $10,000. At trial, the jury found that Guidry did not suffer damages in the first accident, but found that he did suffer damages in the second accident; they jury awarded Guidry medical expenses in the amount of $19,860 and general damages of $10,000. The jury also found that Progressive had been “arbitrary and capricious” in handling Guidry’s claims for general damages and medical expenses from both accidents; specifically, Progressive never tendered any money to Guidry for either claim. Accordingly, it awarded Guidry $50,000 for Progressive’s breach of duty and $10,000 in attorney fees. Then the trial judge awarded Guidry $100,000 in statutory penalties against Progressive.

Progressive appealed the penalty award to the Third Circuit. The court upheld the award after a review of Progressive’s handling of Guidry’s claims. Progressive admitted receiving proper notice of Guidry’s accidents in September, 2006 but disputed that Guidry could establish the amount of his damages. The general rule for UM carriers is that if the insured can show that “he was not at fault, that the other driver was uninsured or underinsured, and that he was in fact damaged,” the UM insurer cannot avoid liability just because the insured is unable to prove the exact extent of his general damages. Instead, the insurer “must tender the reasonable amount due as a sign of its good faith and its willingness to comply with the duties imposed upon it under the insurance policy.” See McDill v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. The tendered amount would not be to settle the case, but to show good faith. Once the good-faith tender is made, the insurer must take “substantive and affirmative steps” evaluate the claim. In this case, Progressive opened its claim file in September, 2006 but did not depose Guidry’s treating physician and orthopedist until June, 2008–nearly two years later. It failed to pay Guidy any money towards the $3,500 in costs to repair his truck. Also, Progressive failed to tender any of the medical payment coverage ($5,000 per accident) included in Guidry’s policy, even though it ample evidence that injuries had resulted from the second accident. Guidry finally had shoulder surgery some four years after the second accident to relieve his debilitating pain, which was paid for by Medicare. Thus, the court concluded that “the jury was not unreasonable in finding that Progressive breached its duty to Mr. Guidry by failing to pay the amount of any claim within sixty days and by failing in its duty to timely investigate the accidents.”

What should have been a simple resolution for Mr. Guidry turned into a four-year-long nightmare of shoulder pain because his insurance carrier mishandled and delayed the payment he was entitled to receive under his policy. This case shows the value of an experienced accident attorney who can advocate on behalf of an injured victim.

Continue reading

Those living in low-lying areas and near rivers often seek, and often obtain, flood insurance. Many of the policies granted come from insurance providers that have opted into the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Under this program, property owners are issued flood insurance through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The federal government, in an effort to expand the NFIP, created the Write Your Own program. These policies provide identical coverage as regular NFIP insurance, except they are administered through local insurance companies. These insurance companies increase community awareness of the NFIP in return for expenses related to claims written and processed. FEMA retains all responsibility for claim losses.

These policies, like any other insurance policy, are only active for the policy period. However, once the policy period has expired, FEMA and Write Your Own insurers typically extend a grace period of thirty days. This means that if the policy holder pays a renewal premium within thirty days of the policy’s expiration, the renewal will be retroactive, essentially covering the gap between the policy expiration and the payment of the premium. If the policy holder fails to pay the renewal premium before the grace period ends, then the policy terminates at its original expiration date and no grace period claims can be processed under it.

This retroactive policy renewal was the issue in Campo v. Allstate Insurance Company. Here, Campo’s flood insurance expired and Allstate sent him notice of the expiration along with the option of retroactive renewal. During this grace period Campo’s property was damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Due to the excessive number of claims arising from Katrina, FEMA increased NFIP grace periods from thirty days to ninety. Campo contacted Allstate and procured an insurance check to cover his living expenses. No further discussion of policy renewal took place. Campo’s ninety day grace period expired without any renewal premium payment. Therefore, when Campo filed his insurance claim it was denied as the policy was not retroactively renewed to cover the damage caused during the grace period. Campo sued Allstate claiming that Allstate had negligently misrepresented the status of his policy.

The only way to succeed on a claim of negligent misrepresentation by an insurance company is to show that the insurance company had a legal duty to supply correct information, that that duty was breached, and that damages resulted from justifiable reliance on that misrepresentation. In most cases, as in Campo’s, the third prong of this test is the most difficult to satisfy. The reasoning behind this is simple: policy holders have access to correct information through the policy contract that they possess. Thus, courts may find damages flowed from an unjustified reliance on the misstatement because the policy itself is clear.

Yet, under this test, Campo succeeded on his damages claim in district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, on the other hand, reversed in favor of Allstate. The reasoning behind this decision is that Campo was fully aware that he was required to pay a premium in order to obtain the retroactive renewal of his policy. In conversations with Allstate, Campo failed to discuss the renewal, and, in addition, the check provided by Allstate during the grace period was not a promise that it would pay Campo’s claim. In short, the court viewed Campo as being responsible for knowing the terms of the insurance policy he held. Insurance policy holders have access to the terms of their policy and are therefore in a position to familiarize themselves with relevant provisions.

Since much of Louisiana is prone to flooding, it is important to protect yourself by obtaining flood insurance. However, once a policy is issued, be sure to read through the terms and know the conditions of renewal. When a policy expires, it is the policy holder’s responsibility to take action for renewal.

Insurance disputes such as these are complex and best left to an experienced practicing attorney.

Continue reading

Previously on the Insurance Dispute blog, we have reviewed cases where the court analyzied various policy provisions that are intended to limit the scope of the insurer’s coverage. One recent example was a clause in a hazard insurance policy that limited the insurer’s responsibility for certain economic damages that resulted from a covered loss. Coverage limitations are common features in other types of policies, as well. For instance, a workers compensation insurance policy will typically include provisions that define the type of injuries that fall under the policy and specify the timeframe in which claims must be made. The recent case of Continental Holdings, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. offers an example of a court’s analysis of such a provision. Continental Holdings purchased a Workers Compensation/Employers’ Liability Policy from Liberty Mutual on October 1, 1964. The policy’s term ended on July 1, 1973. It covered two kinds of work-related injuries: bodily injury “by accident,” and bodily injury “by disease.” The policy specifically excluded coverage for claims of “bodily injury by disease unless prior to thirty-six months after the end of the policy period written claim is made or suit is brought against the insured for damages because of such injury or death resulting therefrom.” In 2009, a group of former employees, certified as a class, sued Continental for hearing loss caused by their long-term exposure to industrial noise while working for the company. In their complaint, the employees alleged that the hearing loss “was painless, and occurred gradually over a long period of time as a result of their continuous long term exposure to hazardous industrial noise at [Continental’s] facility.” Continental filed suit against Liberty Mutual seeking indemnity for the employees’ claims in the hearing loss suit, arguing that the policy purchased in 1964 covered the workers’ hearing loss. Liberty Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it was not required to indemnify Continental because noise-induced hearing-loss was not an “accident” and therefore was subject to the 36-month exclusion under the policy. The district court granted Liberty Mutual’s motion, and Continental appealed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on Louisiana law to guide its analysis. At the time the policy was taken out, the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Act (“LWCA”) was in effect and was incorporated by reference in the policy. The LWCA included the following definition of “accident”: “an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.” Continental asserted that the industrial noise the workers were exposed to created an “objective injury” and therefore fell under Louisiana’s then-existing statutory definition of “accident.” It backed up its position with the affidavit of Dr. Robert Dobie, which explained that noise-induced hearing loss can be measured at the moment a noise is heard through an audiogram test. The court noted, however, that “the vast majority of Louisiana cases,” including one that held “gradual hearing loss resulting from occupational noise exposure … cannot meet the definition of an ‘accident’ under any version of the LWCA,” reach[es] a contrary conclusion.” The court observed that the Continental workers did not claim that a single event caused their hearing loss. Nor did they experience any symptoms during the period of time that the Liberty Mutual policy was in effect. These facts were contrary to the court’s own prior holding that Louisiana’s definition of “accident” requires “at least … some identifiable event or incident within the policy term where the employee can demonstrate a palpable injury.” By way of example, the court recalled a case that involved “a sudden, acute, and identifiable injury during the period of employment.” The employee-plaintiff complained of ear pain immediately after exposure to noise, requested and was denied a transfer, and then over the course of a few months experienced nearly total deafness. The court concluded, therefore, that the gradual, noise-induced hearing loss that the Continental workers suffered was “not an ‘accident’ under the LWCA.” Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that the workers’ injuries must be classified as “bodily injury by disease,” thus triggering the 36-month exclusion.

It is important to note that the Fifth Circuit’s decision did not necessarily create a negative outcome for the workers themselves. Indeed, their suit (filed in state court) was merely put on hold until the conclusion of this action, which only served to determine that Liberty Mutual would not be responsible for any damages due the workers if they ultimately prevailed against Continental.

Continue reading

In a prior post, we examined the case of Berk-Cohen Associates, L.L.C. v. Landmark American Insurance Company, which concerned a dispute over an insurer’s coverage of lost revenue suffered by the Forest Isle Apartments complex in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The district court found that the lost revenue experienced by the apartment’s owner, Berk-Cohen, was covered under the policy issued by Landmark. Based on this finding, it assessed Landmark penalties and attorney’s fees for its misinterpretation of its policy and refusal to pay Berk-Cohen for the lost revenue that it deemed covered under the policy. Landmark appealed the assessment (along with the district court’s finding on the coverage issue); although the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding as to insurance coverage, it reversed on the issue of the penalty.

Under Louisiana law, an insurance company generally has 30 days after receiving a demand letter and written proof of loss to pay a claim. A court can assess a penalty against an insurer that fails to pay within 30 days “when such failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:1892(B)(1). The penalty is calculated as 50 percent of difference between the amount actually paid and the amount due. Attorney’s fees and costs can also be part of the assessment. No penalty is available “when there is a reasonable and legitimate question as to the extent and causation of a claim.” In the case of Louisiana Bag Co. v. Audubon Indemnity Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court assessed penalties against an insurer that failed to pay the uncontested portion of a claim and refused coverage for a loss that was clearly included in the policy. The court found that “no reasonable uncertainty existed as to the insurer’s obligation to pay,” and so its position was “arbitrary and without probable cause.”

The Fifth Circuit concluded, however, that the Forest Isle Apartments case was unlike the situation in Louisiana Bag. “The scope of the flood exclusion,” reasoned the court, “with its reference to all damage ’caused directly or indirectly’ by flooding, is susceptible to different interpretations.” Landmark, therefore, was “neither arbitrary nor capricious” in refusing to pay Berk-Cohen for lost revenue based on the favorable business conditions brought on by hurricane flooding. The court also found it important that Landmark had already paid out more than $20 million on undisputed portions of Berk-Cohen’s claims. In light of this, Landmark’s dispute over the lost revenue claim could reasonably be considered a “good-faith error” in interpreting the policy. In addition, the court noted that under Louisiana jurisprudence, an unfavorable judgment does not necessarily call for the statutory penalty. Thus, the court reversed the district court’s assessment of penalties against Landmark.

Continue reading

Contact Information